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Short-tennism on Trial: An Empirical Approach 
The Macmillan Gap has been in existence since the virtual disappearance 
of the individual capitalist and the private banker. .. 
J.B. Kinross 
The Finance of Small Business 
May 1938 
... without facts we can do nothing: but with facts, until they have been 
passed through the mill of thought and their lessons educed from them 
by reason, we can still do nothing. 
I. Introduction 
A.C. Pigou 
In Memoriam: Alfred Marshall 
April 1925 
The influence of the private banker on industrial development and economic growth 
has been the subject of considerable historical debate. I . Bradford De Long asked 
"Did I .P. Morgan's Men Add Value?" (De Long 1991). The debate has questioned 
whether the fmance capitalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
either visionaries building firms which benefited from their entrepreneurial abilities 
or rather robber barons creating furns which extracted monopoly profits as a result of 
industry dominance. These private bankers included the large German credit banks , 
such as Deutsche Bank, and the American investment banks, such as I.P. Morgan & 
Co. The facts indicate that both played influential, if not dominate, roles financing 
those furns instrumental to industrialization. The distinguishing characteristics of the 
German and American finance capitalists were their close relations with and intimate 
knowledge of the furns they financed. I 
I See Tilly (1986) for the role which credit banks played in German 
industrialisation and Neuburger (1977) for the intimate knowledge and influence 
Deutsche Bank had on its client Siemens. See Davis (1963; 1966) for the role which 
investment banks played in financing U.S. industry and Corey (1930: Chapter 14) for 
I .P. Morgan's early rise as a fmance capitalist. See De Long (1991) for a description 
of Morgan's influential role in the development of AT&T and International Harvester. 
See Tilly (1989) for a comparative perspective on U .S. and German banking 
institutions . 
Measuring the private bankers ' "valued added" has been difficult. German industry 
relied predominantly, and almost exclusively, upon credit banks . U.S . industry, as 
a result of risk averse commercial banks, understandably so without a central bank 
until 1914, depended upon private means, mergers and de facto public tlotations for 
industrial fInance (Navin and Sears 1955) . Pre-War Britain also provides little help 
for an empirical analysis . With relatively sophisticated public capital markets 
beginning in the seventeenth century, early industrialization in sectors requiring limited 
amounts of capital and, again like the U.S., risk averse commercial banks, British 
industry did not rely upon private bankers for fmance. 
In recent years , as a result of the economic success of Japan and Germany relative to 
the United States and Great Britain, the finance capitalism debate has resurfaced 
(Marsh 1990; Porter 1993; Teitelman 1993) . The question now asked is, "Have the 
close relationships between fmance and industry contributed to the relative success of 
Japan and Germany?"2 The debate has centred on the question whether capital 
market-dominated fmancial systems are tlawed to such an extent as to harm national 
economic performance. There is a belief that impersonal capital markets have an 
inherent focus on short-term profItability which leads to shorter investment horizons 
both by suppliers and by users of capital . As a result, both agents, impatient with the 
length of time often required to develop commercial opportunities, do not make 
sufficient investment in R&D and capital formation which is required for long-term 
economic success (see TABLE 1). This behaviour has become known as short-
termism or managerial myopia. 
Unfortunately, the existing literature on the topic has been mainly theoretical (Black 
2 See Francke and Hudson (1984) for a discussion of the reestablishment of close 
ties between German fmance and industry following World War II . See Eckstein 
(1980) , Cable (1985) and Edwards and Fischer (1991) for a discussion of more recent 
relations between German fmance and industry. See Dore (1992) for an excellent 
discussion of Japanese kereitsus -- fInns with interlocking ownership resulting in close 
relationships between fmance and industry and among corporations themselves . 
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TABLE 1 
Comparative Economic Performance 
(1960 to 1989) 
Real GOP Capital Formation 
Growth (l!\ GOPl 
5.5 % 25% 
2.8 16 
2.2 14 
2 .1 14 
Indus\1)'-Financed 
R&O (l!\ GOPl 
2.0% 
1.8 
1.3 
1.I 
1986; De Long et al. 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1990; Stein 1988, 1989) or rhetorical 
(Marsh 1990; Porter 1993; Teitelman 1993). There have been few attempts to 
compare the behaviour and performance of firms funded by fmance capitalists or by 
impersonal capital markets .3 A popular alternative frequently attempted for 
comparing bank-dominated and capital market-dominated fmance has been to compare 
the fmancial performance of German and Japanese firms to American or British fmns . 
But such international comparisons introduce numerous complicating factors, including 
differences in accounting practices, educational systems and management style, as well 
as differing government policies and regulations. Thus an alternative approach to 
evaluating these two methods of business fmance needs to be formulated. Great 
Britain provides such an alternative. 
In November 1929, the British government, hoping to discover the reason and possible 
solutions for Britain's economic plight, appointed the Committee on Finance and 
Industry, or the Macmillan Committee, to investigate whether Britain' s system of 
financial intermediation was contributing to the nation's economic problems. The 
Committee considered at length the close relationships between fmance and industry 
in Germany and concluded in 1931, among other things, that existing channels of 
3 There is a plethora of research on capital market reaction to or influence on 
capital formation. The most interesting include Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and McConneU and Muscarrella (1985), but none 
of these include bank-fmanced firms for a comparative perspective. 
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fmancial intermediation, while adequately serving international fmance and conunerce, 
did not adequately serve the long-term capital needs of British industry . The 
Conunittee reconunended the creation of institutions which would employ a fmance 
capitalism operating approach. Although the Conunittee's reconunendations were not 
inunediately acted upon, following World War 11 two institutions were established 
based on the conclusions that the Macmillan Conunittee had reached some 14 years 
earlier -- the Finance Corporation for Industry (FCI) was founded to promote 
rationalization of Britain's troubled larger industries and the Industrial and Conunercial 
Finance Corporation (lCFC) was established to serve the long-term capital needs of 
small and medium-sized frrms .4 
Although 3i was established to fmance small and medium-sized frrms, its largest 
clients were of equivalent size to publicly-floated frrms . Thus , the existence of 3i 
allows for the unique evaluation of bank-oriented and capital market-oriented finance 
within a single nation eliminating the complicating factors associated with an 
international comparison. The purpose of this paper will be to investigate empirically 
the investment behaviour and fmancial performance of 3i-fmanced frrms relative to 
publicly-floated frrms of similar size and industry . But before the empirical analysis , 
in order to understand 3i as a fmance capitalist, just as German credit banks and 
Japanese kereitsus have unique characteristics, it will be helpful to understand both the 
impetus for 3i and its organisational and operational structure. 
11. The Impetus for British Finance Capitalism 
In November 1929, the Treasury, at the request of the newly elected Labour 
Government, appointed the Conunittee on Finance and Industry "to enquire into 
banking, fmance and credit, paying regard to the factors both internal and international 
which govern their operation, and to make reconunendations calculated to promote the 
4 FCI was merged with ICFC in 1973 to create Finance for Industry (FFI) . As 
part of an image change, FFI' s name was changed to 3i (Investors in Industry) in 
1983. The pre-1973 historical discussion of this paper relates to ICFC, and the name 
3i will be used in place of ICFC except for quotations in which ICFC was used. 
4 
development of trade and commerce and the employment labour" (Parliamentary Paper 
Cmnd 3897: para 1). ~ The period was marked by great consternation within the 
British government as it tried to come to grips with the economic downturn which had 
begun in 1929 and whose severity had increased dramatically by the time the 
Committee's fmal report was delivered to Parliament in June 1931. The members of 
the Macmillan Committee were some of Britain's leading economic and political 
figures, including John Maynard Keynes , Reginald McKenna, former Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, and Ernest Bevin, Labour trade union leader. The scope of the report 
was wide, investigating the international gold standard, the monetary system of Great 
Britain, including the Bank of England, the joint stock banks and the accepting houses 
and discount markets , as well as the economic problems which Britain was 
encountering. 
The Macmillan Committee opened its discussion of the banking system by praising the 
sophistication of the City of London, noting the scope and breadth of its markets, the 
role it played in financing international trade, providing overseas investment 
opportunities and generally serving British commerce. 
The City of London can still claim to be the most highly organised international 
market for money in the world. Its accepting houses and its discount market provide 
unequalled facilities for the fmancing of national and international commerce (Cmnd 
3897: para 375) . 
However, subsequent discussion identified the City's weaknesses and delivered a 
scathing comment on the performance of recent flotations . The Committee noted that 
domestic new issues during 1928 had subsequently lost 47 % of their value, and it 
attributed this in no small part to the absence of a perceived responsibility of Britain' s 
fmancial institutions to both domestic industry and investors, responsibility which the 
Committee felt they had been providing to their international clients. 
~ The debate on the adequacy of British fmancial markets had begun well before 
the Macmillan Committee in 1929. See Edelstein (1971) for an excellent historical 
discussion and numerous references . 
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The Macmillan Committee believed that the weak relationship and responsibility 
between fmance and domestic industry was harming the British economy, and it 
considered at length the close relationships in Gennany, France and the United States. 
But the relations between the British fmancial world and British industry, as distinct 
from British commerce, have never been so close as between Gennan fmance and 
Gennan industry or between American finance and American industry (Cmnd 3897: 
para 276). In Europe, particularly in Gennany, there has been a different relationship 
between banks and industries, and bankers have been forced to associate themselves 
more closely with industrial development. Accepting these heavy responsibilities, they 
were obliged to keep in more intimate touch with and maintain a more continuous 
watch over the industries with which they had allied themselves than were the English 
banks (Cmnd 3897: para 378) . 
Believing Britain could benefit from employing a similar fmance capitalism approach, 
the Committee concluded Britain should establish institutions which could provide 
long-tenn capital as well as play an active role in directing and restructuring industry. 
Two finns were subsequently established. FCI was to serve Britain' s larger 
industries, particularly promoting their rationalisation. ICFC, on the other hand, was 
to serve small and medium-sized enterprises . The Committee believed Britain's 
capital market-dominated fmancial system did not serve the fmancing needs of finns 
which required long-tenn capital in amounts less than £200,000, a defect which 
became known as the Macmillan Gap. ICFC was to provide both debt and equity 
capital, and it was to assume a level of responsibility in contributing to the fmancial 
success of its customers greater than Britain' s clearing banks traditionally had 
assumed . 
ICFC did not commence operations until 14 years after the Macmillan Committee 
presented its report, and during this period, in particular after World War IT, there 
was considerable debate as to 3i's ownership, organisational structure and operating 
philosophy. Following the War, there was a move towards greater state intervention 
in the British economy as there were many within Whitehall who believed government 
should play an active role in facilitating the transition from a war-time to peace-time 
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economy. The parties involved in establishing 3i, including the Board of Trade, 
Treasury , Bank of England and the clearing banks, all held opinions as to the degree 
of influence which the British government should have on 3i's operations. 
The Board of Trade saw 3i ' s lending philosophy not based on collateral but instead 
based on the quality of people and their experience. Without collateral, the Board of 
Trade believed such an institution would require some form of government 
participation or underwriting of fmancial facilities (ie, below market interest rates). 
As the opinions of the other participants were against this type of government 
involvement, the Board of Trade felt that it should have some form of less 
interventionist oversight, including reviewing successful and, more importantly, 
unsuccessful applications . It was the unsuccessful applicant, those with an unproven 
track record and no collateral , that the Board of Trade hoped 3i would promote. The 
Treasury wanted to use 3i as a macroeconomic tool, much as the Special Areas 
Reconstruction Association (SARA) and the Nuffield Trust were to have encouraged 
the redevelopment of depressed regions and the promotion of full employment (Heim 
1984) . 
But while the Board of Trade and Treasury foresaw a close link between 3i and 
Whitehall, the Bank of England saw 3i more as a tool to quiet the raucous demands 
of a potentially interventionist government. In fact, Senior Executive Otto Neimeyer 
saw the small business community as having "political importance disproportionate to 
its real importance" (Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985 : Neimeyer memo, May 10, 1945) . 
Montagu Norman believed the British government should not be in the banking 
business as envisioned by the Board of Trade or Treasury, yet he knew a fum of some 
institutional form would be needed to quiet Whitehall. 
The banks themselves were less than enthusiastic with the prospect of having to 
participate in such a venture, primarily for two reasons . First, they did not want to 
venture far from providing self-liquidating loans, and second they did not want to give 
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preferential treatment over their established customers (ie, government subsidised or 
below market interest rates) . Realizing, as had the Bank of England, that an 
institution was inevitable, the clearing banks proposed in 1944 for each to establish 
a subsidiary for providing such fmance . The Bank of England rejected this proposal 
"as being inadequate, comprising 'five sheep wandering at random' none with any 
particular competence, and lacking the publicity value of a single new institution." 
(Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985: Neimeyer memo, January 31, 1944). Ultimately the 
clearing banks, including Barclays, Lloyds , Midland, National Provincial , and 
Westminster, succumbed to pressure and agreed to participate in the formation of an 
independent institution. And although Barclays believed such an institution was not 
needed, it also believed an independent institution would allow it to have a reputation 
wholly separate from the British banking community, in particular, preventing the 
perception that British banks were adopting continental banking practices. 
Thus, as Coopey and Clarke concluded, "Most of the participants in the process knew 
more clearly what they did not want rather than what they did . This indecision and 
mutual distrust allowed the frrst Chairman ofICFC to mould the corporation along the 
lines which were to form the basis of its longevity" (Coopey and Clarke forthcoming : 
Chapter 1). While the Macmillan Committee in 1931 and the participants in the 
debate during the intervening 14 year period clearly outlined the purpose of the new 
institution, that is providing longer term fmance to small and medium-sized frrms , as 
well as its very general form, an independent institution from both banks and 
government, its organisational structure and lending approach were left to 3i 's first 
Chairman, William Piercy (later Lord Piercy).6 
6 One of the most remarkable initial characteristics the participants did agree to 
was 3i 's size. The targeted funding was £15 million of equity and £30 million of 
debt. No other existing institution which provided small frrm finance , including 
Credit for Industry , Charterhouse Industrial Development Co. and Leadenhall 
Securities Corp., was of equal size. All three institutions had been established in the 
1930's and had demonstrated less than resounding success . Credit for Industry and 
Leadenhall Securities each had provided only £250,000 of capital by the late 1930's 
and Charterhouse had provided less than £600,000 at September 1937 (Kinross and 
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m. The Development of a British Finance Capitalist 
3i's organizational structure and operating approach was determined by Piercy who 
in turn was influenced largely by J .B. Kinross, 3i's fIrst General Manager. Piercy 
and Kinross brought complementary skills . Both had successful backgrounds in 
fmance; Piercy also brought government and political experience while Kinross 
contributed industrial experience. 
Piercy had a diverse professional background. In 1914 he received a B.Sc. (Econ) 
from the London School of Economics . During World War I he worked as a civil 
servant for the Ministry of Munitions . He further strengthened his government and 
political skills during World War 11, working for the Ministry of Production and 
Ministry of Supply as well as serving as a personal assistant to Deputy Prime Minister 
Attlee. His fmance experience came as a result of an eight-year membership from 
1934 to 1942 with the London Stock Exchange. During this period he developed unit 
trusts for channelling small savings of the general public into groups of quoted London 
Stock Exchange securities, and although he earned a considerable fortune from the 
management of these trusts , he pioneered the unit trust movement largely for social 
motives (Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985: 53). In February 1946, Piercy was appointed 
to the Court of the Bank of England by Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and a friend from the LSE. Because of his public and private sector success, Piercy 
had become regarded as a successful fmancier and a Labour Party intellectual . Thus 
with his prior association with AttJee as well as with Dalton, it is not surprising that 
he was chosen to be 3i 's fIrst Chairman. 
Butt-Philip 1985 : 336-337) . Even more important, these institutions generally did not 
provide equity capital and only lent against fIxed assets. As Piercy noted in 1955, 
they were not a satisfactory source of long-term capital; they were either a "grooming 
house" preparing ftrms for a later public issue or they only lent against secured assets 
(Piercy 1955: 2). The March 1944 Memorandum of the Committee of London 
Clearing Banks suggested this lack of success may have been an indication that the 
Macmillan Gap did not exist (Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985: Appendix 2, Committee 
of London Clearing Banks memo, March 29 , 1944), but failure simply may have been 
the result of restrictive lending practices and not properly addressing the Macmillan 
Gap . 
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Kinross brought industrial and fmance experience; he was a professional engineer by 
training . After spending eight years as a practising engineer in Scotland, he accepted 
a position in 1928 with London's Gresham Trust where he was the manager of the 
new issues department, responsible for funding smaller businesses. He established his 
own firm, Cheviot Trust, in 1934 for raising capital for smaller firms . With a 
network of investors who were interested in smaller flrms , Kinross utilised direct mail 
techniques to solicit interest in new issues, and during the five and one-half years prior 
to World War IT he successfully completed 100 public issues (Kinross and Butt-Philip 
1985: 61). 
In 1938, Kinross wrote a 29-page memorandum entitled "The Finance of Small 
Business" which he gave to Sir Henry Clay at the Bank of England. In it he outlined 
the details of an organisation for funding smaller Scottish fInns. Kinross thought his 
ideas were dead with the onset of World War n, but in 1945 an opportunity to enact 
his ideas , in response to the Macmillan Report, became a possibility. In July 1945, 
Kinross provided a copy of his memo to Piercy who responded by agreeing with 
nearly its entire contents . Kinross subsequently was selected as one of 3i' s first 
employees , and many of his ideas fonned the basis of 3i' s lending approach. 
Two elements stand out in Kinross' memo. First, he believed risk assessment for 
smaller furns should not be based upon fmancial statement analysis alone . Rather risk 
assessment also required an assessment of fundamental business risks . These risks 
could only be assessed via a thorough investigation by both accountants and industrial 
advisers. An industrial adviser, Kinross explained, would be a "man of wide business 
experience .. . who would look at the concern from the businessman's point of view " 
(Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985: Appendix 6, Kinross memo, May 1938). Second, 
Kinross believed such lend.ing required ongoing monitoring and control. 
The fundamental principle underlying all this would be that the Corporation would not 
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introduce money into a business and then leave the previous owners to run it without 
a reasonable measure of control... there are very few men running a small business 
who possess the necessary experience and breadth of vision to enable them to enlarge 
it to a bigger concern without making a good many mistakes in the process (Kinross 
and Butt-Philip 1985: Appendix 6, Kinross memo, May 1938). 
Kinross envisioned this monitoring and control would be accomplished by a staff of 
industrial advisers keeping close tabs on financial performance as well as serving as 
non-executive board members. 
During the first two years of operation, Piercy and Kinross established an organisation 
which reflected the details outlined in "The Finance of Small Business" memorandum. 
In the months immediately following 3i's establishment, they assembled a staff with 
a wide range of professional experience, including a banker, four experts on the 
issuing business (one of whom was a former employee of SARA who was adept at 
small firm investigations), two stockbrokers, three chartered accountants, a lawyer, 
an economist, a production engineer and a building expert (few 1955: 218). The 
production engineer and building expert assumed the titles Chief Inspector and 
Chartered Surveyor and Valuer. With respect to the Chief Inspector, the intention was 
to recruit" a man with wide industrial experience to take charge of the industrial team, 
who would investigate new applicants and also keep in touch with the progress of 
completed cases" (Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985: 80) . 
In February 1946, 3i's Board considered representation on client company boards and 
concluded 
The appointment by the Corporation of its nominee as director to the Boards of 
Borrowing Companies in suitable cases was approved in principal, but it was agreed 
that it would be undesirable to select members of the Corporation's staff for such 
appointments (Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985: Board Minute 102, February 1946) . 
Kinross reveals in ICFC 1945-1961 this issue was "discussed at considerable length" 
but during his entire tenure with 3i, from 1945 to 1974, it was rare for a member of 
3i staff to be appointed to any client company board. Although 3i decided against 
such control, Kinross' historical account of the discussion does not reveal why the 
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Board reached this decision. One may conclude from ICFC 1945-1961 a practical 
reason may have been that Board representation would have diluted the time of 3i' s 
industrial advisers who, because of their required industrial expertise and ability to 
assess fundamental business risk, were in short supply and who as weB were busy 
evaluating potential new clients . 3i generally did not rely upon non-employee board 
representatives either. It had taken the power to appoint a director in 135 of its 460 
customers outstanding at the end of May 1954, but in only 53 cases had a director 
actually been appointed by 3i (Tew 1955 : 232) . 
By late 1948, when the staff numbered nearly 60, 3i's basic organisational structure 
had been established. A Cases Committee was composed of senior executives who 
initial1y reviewed every case and who approved al1 fmal fmancing proposals . The 
Examinations Department included controllers who maintained client relationships , 
accountants who were responsible for fmancial risk assessment and the industrial 
advisers . In addition, there was a Legal Department, Secretarial Department and an 
Economic Intelligence Unit. Subsequent monitoring was accomplished principal1y by 
the Accounting Department. Monthly trends of sales, expenses and other fmancial 
items of its clients were monitored for unsatisfactory results . In addition, the 
Accounting Department assisted clients in developing cost and budgeting records not 
only for the benefit of the client but for the security of 3i 's investment as weB. 
In 1948 it became evident that in its rush to expand 3i had made several poor 
investments . In November 1948, the list of companies for which loss provisions had 
been established had to be increased from 7 to 20, and bad debts of £135 ,000 were 
recorded against an operating profit of £219,834. Thus as Kinross noted it took the 
losses of only a few bad cases to wipe out the profit earned from 3i' s entire £15 
million investment portfolio of 273 companies (Kinross and Butt-Philip 1985: 137). 
As a result, a Management Team, or "Breakdown Gang" as it became known 
internally, was established. This "Gang" was a group of professionals who had 
industry, consultancy and industrial accounting experience. They became actively 
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involved in helping to diagnose and to resolve unsatisfactory trends revealed by the 
Accounting Department. Their role typically was to identify management weaknesses 
and to assist in making such managerial changes. 
As a result of its experiences during the early years, 3i developed a "hands off' 
investment approach -- it carefully assessed potential customers and monitored 
subsequent perfonnance, but it did not exercise board control or direct influence 
envisioned by Kinross . 3i largely has retained this "hands off' approach during its 45 
year history . A 1976 survey of 3i clients by an independent consulting firm confIrms 
this investment philosophy (Marketing and Opinion Research International 1976). 
Clients indicated that they thought of 3i as a specialist type of bank and chose 3i 
because of its hands off approach. Clients saw 3i' s role as providing fmance and 
advice on long-tenn strategic issues such as acquisitions but not necessarily general 
business strategy. In addition they revealed almost all subsequent contact had been 
initiated by themselves , not 3i. A discussion with a 3i industrial adviser confIrms 3i' s 
investment approach is still practised today (Wood August 18, 1993). 3i does not 
concern itself with daily operating decisions of its clients nor does it attend board 
meetings. 3i only becomes involved when its monthly monitoring process reveals 
negative trends , and the extent of its involvement at such times is identifying 
managerial weaknesses and "suggesting" changes. Thus it appears from historical 
records, client surveys, and discussions with 3i personnel that its success is the result 
of the initial assessment of fundamental business risk, requiring more sophisticated 
management techniques, such as cost and budgeting controls, and becoming actively 
involved only when potential trouble develops . 
In sum, there are three characteristics which distinguish 3i as a fmance capitalist. 
First, 3i provides long-tenn fmance , including loans with less restrictive terms than 
nonnally available (for example, unsecured loans with terms as long as 12 to 15 years 
as compared to three to five year secured commercial bank loans) as well as equity 
capital (see TABLE 2 for an analysis of the fmancial facilities provided by 3i). In 
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TABLE 2 
Selected 3i Portfolio Characteristics 
(pounds in Thousands) 1946' ~ J21L --122!L 
Number of Companies 133 364 2,077 4, 126 
Total Invesonents : 
Nominal £5,071 £20 ,643 £125,350 £2 ,0 19,588 
Real (1946 = 100) 5,07 1 16,258 48,483 110,504 
Average Invesonent: 
Nominal £38 £57 £60 £489 
Real 38 45 23 27 
Facil ities Provided: 
Secured Loans 37 % 36 % 60 % 45 % 
Unsecured Loans 23 27 6 16 
Preferred Shares 37 29 10 13 
Ordinary Shares 3 8 24 26 
Largest lnvesments as a % 
of Portfolio: 
Nominal lnvesonent Greater than £100 £100 £200 £2,000 
Real Amount Greater than 100 79 77 109 
As a % of Companies 7% 14 % 16% 5% 
As a % of Invesonents 28% 45 % 62 % 48 % 
NOles: I Approved invesunent but not necessarily completed . 
addition, 3i stands ready to provide additional funds such that clients need never rely 
on Britain' s capital markets . At March 1990, nearly 50 % of 3i' s U.K. investments 
had been made prior to 1985, 7 % had been made 21 or more years ago and just under 
40 % of investee companies had received a second or subsequent 3i investment 
(Bannock 1992: 1) . Second, rather than utilizing an accounting-oriented evaluation 
process alone, 3i 's industrial advisers carefully assess potential clients based on a 
thorough business investigation. As a result, 3i establishes close relations with its 
clients during its initial investigation process, while its direct influence is limited 
primarily to periods when its ongoing monitoring process identifies potential problems 
or when clients specifically ask for strategic advice. Finally, 3i is an organization 
independent from the British government. It is not used by Whitehall as a 
macroeconomic tool nor does it receive any special fonn of governmental assistance 
or funding (except for the government's initial pressure forcing the clearing banks and 
the Bank of England to establish 3i). Since July 1959 when 3i completed its first £10 
million public debenture offering, it primarily has relied upon the public debt markets 
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for additional funding, not its clearing banks owners. As such, it must provide its 
funding at market rates, and it must take an interest in the fmancial success of its 
clients to ensure that both clients and 3i prosper. 
In its more than 45 year history, 3i has acted as a fmance capitalist to many British 
companies. Between 1945 and 1990 3i invested £5.7 billion in 11 ,500 companies, and 
at March 1990, 3i's portfolio contained 4,126 finns, 3,700 of which were UK-based. 
With nearly half of its investments in the manufacturing sector, its investee companies 
accounted for between seven and ten percent of Britain's manufacturing employment 
(Bannock 1992: 1). 3i also has funded larger fInns since its inception. As a 
percentage of its portfolio, investments of approximately £100,000 pounds or greater 
have represented between five and 16 percent of total clients and 28 to 62 percent of 
its aggregate investment portfolio (see TABLE 2). Following the merger with FCr in 
1973, which was established to rationalize Britain's larger industries, and the further 
consolidation of rCFC and FCr into 3i during the 1980s, 3i's portfolio contains a 
significant number of larger finns . Thus with its long-standing fmance capitalism 
operating approach and investments in firms of similar size to publicly-floated firms, 
3i provides a unique method for empirically analysing the short-tennism debate. 
IV. The Short-termism Debate 
Paul Marsh of the London Business School and Michael Porter of the Harvard 
Business School have each published comprehensive analyses of the short-termism 
debate (Marsh 1990; Porter 1993) . Each begins with similar opening statements. 
Porter begins, "The U .S. system of allocating investment capital is threatening the 
competitiveness of American finns and the long-term growth of the national 
economy... . As a result of this system, many American finns invest too little in those 
assets and capabilities most required for competitiveness (such as employee training), 
while wasting capital on investments with limited fmancial or social rewards (such as 
unrelated acquisitions)" (Porter 1993: 3). Marsh begins, "Short-tennism - or the 
notion that Britain's and America's competitive edge has been dulled by the two 
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countries' failure to emphasize long-term investment, and that this, in turn, is the fault 
of their myopic fmancial markets - has been a hot issue now for several years " (Marsh 
1990: 1) . Although they have both identified the same factor which may contribute 
to short-termism, that is either reduced or inappropriate investment, they have not 
demonstrated either that the investment behaviour of publicly-floated firms differs 
significantly from that of bank-financed finns or that publicly-floated firms have 
inferior financial performance. 
Marsh' s arguments primarily are rhetorical, lacking a theoretical framework needed 
to develop a method for empirical analysis . Marsh argues that capital markets respond 
rationally to company-specific developments , including announcements related to 
R&D, capital expenditures and takeovers, but he does not address the issue if pubJicly-
floated firms behave or perform differently relative to bank-fmanced firms . Porter 
provides a general framework for analysing short-tennism.7 He describes in 
exhaustive detail the faults of the U.S. capital allocation system relative to Germany 
and Japan, and in fact his analysis goes beyond arguing that the problem is simply due 
to impersonal capital markets , rather instead it includes additional factors such as the 
macroeconomic environment, corporate ownership structure and government 
investment incentives. And while he cites studies which reveal international 
differences in corporate investment behaviour, he assumes that superior national 
7 Capital Choices (Porter 1993) is a conclusion Porter reached based on 18 
original research papers commissioned for the study. These research papers are to be 
published at a later date . 
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economic perfonnance indicates superior corporate perfonnance.8 Interestingly, 
Porter indicates future research should include an analysis of the investment behaviour 
of private and public corporations (Porter 1993 : 97). 
To analyse the short-termism debate empirically, a theoretical framework has to be 
developed. The first point to make with respect to the capital allocation system to 
which Porter refers is that it is dominated by competition. There are a large number 
of intennediaries both in Britain and the U. s. competing for wealthholders' investment 
funds . Intennediaries are evaluated and compete for investment funds based upon the 
fmancial returns they achieve for wealthholders. Evaluated often on a quarterly basis, 
intennediaries are under greater pressure to earn higher returns more quickly than 
their competitors (although, as Marsh indicates , the selection of intennediaries by 
wealthholders may not be as frequent as perfonnance measurement (Marsh 1990: 32-
34». Entrepreneurs, as well, compete for capital . They must demonstrate that they 
have the ability to provide competitive returns on invested capital, and although 
intennediaries may evaluate fmancial perfonnance based on many factors , accounting 
profits are the dominant measure (Beaver 1968; Benston 1967; Porter 1993: 43-45) .9 
8 Certainly superior corporate perfonnance in the aggregate is the basis for 
superior national economic perfonnance, but such an argument also depends upon 
additional factors including those mentioned earlier such as educational systems and 
government policies and regulation. In addition, as a result of tax incentives , R&D 
expenditures may be excessive or directed to the wrong industries, and it has not been 
demonstrated that higher levels of R&D expenditures lead to superior economic 
perfonnance. Japan contributes a greater proportion of its national R&D expenditures 
to pharmaceutical research yet competitively lags well behind American and European 
competitors (patel and Pavitt 1987; Piekarz, et al. 1984; Thomas 1989). In addition, 
studies which indicate that leading Japanese finns spend more on intangible 
investments such as R&D than their American counterparts depend on accounting 
practices. 
9 As Rex Bates, Partner of institutional money manger Stein Roe & Farnham and 
discussant of Beaver's paper, stated, "Reported earnings is the name of the game!" 
(Beaver 1968: 93) . The Beaver and Benston papers are dated, but Porter reaches the 
same conclusion based on two of the unpublished papers commissioned for Capital 
Choices . 
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Finally, with multi-divisional firms or fmus with several potential investment projects, 
divisional employees are under pressure to demonstrate that they, as well , can 
commercialize their investment projects profitably. 
A second important element of the theoretical argument is to recognize that capital 
markets exhibit excess volatility. Research has shown that security prices are more 
volatile than their underlying fundamentals (Barsky and De Long 1990; Roll 1984; 
Shiller 1990). This excess volatility is the result of trading which is not based on 
information with fundamental value but rather on "noise", either investor beliefs based 
on whim or attempts to outguess fellow investors; Black (1986) calls such investors 
"noise traders" . Shleifer and Vishny (1990) argue long-term assets , which typically 
fund long-term investment projects, tend to be more mispriced than short-term assets -
- a security representing a long-term investment project has the potential of remaining 
mispriced for a greater length of time before its price is driven to its fundamental 
value because it is subject to greater "second guessing" by noise traders . 
The persistent mispricing of long-term assets has two results . First, it may lead to a 
misallocation of capital . If noise trading is persistent, volatility and risk may be 
increased by a magnitude greater than the asset's underlying fundamental risk .1O As 
a result, fInns may face an unnecessarily high cost of capital which ultimately distorts 
the allocation of capital . Second, mispricing may influence the capital allocation 
process within fmus . Pressure from investors , including institutional investors and 
arbitrageurs who are under competitive pressure to report superior investment returns, 
may force a firm to reduce its long-term investments projects in order to reduce the 
potential for security mispricing . A firm with a mix of less risky and highly uncertain 
investment projects may witness its share price remaining undervalued and, as a result, 
could be susceptible to a hostile takeover where an acquirer can decrease uncertainty 
10 De Long, et al . (1990) have demonstrated theoretically securities prices can 
diverge significantly from fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental risk, 
and this enables noise traders , who are the source of the risk, to earn a higher 
expected return than rational investors. 
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and eliminate mispricing by reducing long-tenn investment projects (in effect, 
changing the underlying security to a shorter time horizon with less associated 
fundamental and noise trader risk). 11 Thus the interaction of fundamental and market 
or noise trader risk combined with pressure from both investors and management for 
near tenn accounting profits may lead finns to forgo rightly justified investment 
projects . These forgone projects ultimately may harm a nation's long-tenn economic 
perfonnance. 
This theoretical construct of uncertainty and noise can be applied to further 
explanations of short-tennism posited by Marsh and Porter. For example, eliminating 
the potential of security mispricing by reducing uncertain investment projects also may 
be in the interests of management as its compensation often includes stock options tied 
to the near tenn share price perfonnance. Investments which Porter refers to as 
intangible assets which are not capitalized, such as R&D, employee training and 
marketing expenses , may be subject to manipulation in an effort to meet short-tenn 
profit expectations. Consumer goods companies may not have the pricing flexibility 
to temporarily reduce product prices and "invest" in market share in order to build 
brand value and ultimately long-tenn profits (Stein 1989). 
The noise framework provides three systematic tests for short-tennism. First, most 
obviously, do publicly-floated finns exhibit superior fmancial perfonnance as 
compared to privately-fmanced fmns? Perfonnance measurements might include sales 
and profit growth, return on invested capital and fluctuations in these indicators . 
Second, do capital markets sub-optimally allocate capital? This analysis could include 
an inter-industry analysis of external capital commitment. It also would be insightful 
to examine if capital commitment is correlated with economic cycles . Securities fmns 
frequently make investment recommendations based on the stage of an economic 
11 Jensen (1989) interpreted the takeover trend of the 1980s as the elimination of 
poorly conceived investment projects pursued by growth-oriented managers. But at 
the same time, management may forgo uncertain investment projects simply because 
of the fear of a takeover. 
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cycle. This behaviour might only shorten investment horizons, hanning those 
industries requiring capital but then currently out of favour with the general market. 
Third, do publicly-floated frrms exhibit differing investment behaviour with respect 
to both fixed asset and intangible investments? Analysis of the rate and stability of 
both intangible and fixed asset investment as well as the profitability of such 
investment would be insightful . 
V. An Empirical Analysis of the Short-tennism Debate 
With a fmance capitalism investment philosophy, 3i provides a unique method for 
empirically analysing the short-termism debate . The overriding goal of the empirical 
analysis is to compare firms of similar size and industry.12 An analysis of 3i' s 
portfolio revealed that the electronics and electrical engineering; food, drink and 
tobacco (FD&T); textiles and distribution sectors contained the greatest number of 
finns with turnover in excess of £5 million (a reasonable lower limit which was found 
for publicly-floated frrms). The FD&T industry would have been a most interesting 
segment to analyze as Britain has maintained a long-standing competitive advantage 
in this industry (Chandler 1990: 261-268, 366-388 and Tables 5 and 7; Patel and 
Pavitt 1987). But a careful examination of 3i' s FD&T clients revealed these 
companies were quite heterogeneous, and it would have been difficult, for the scope 
of this paper, to identify a matched sample of 3i-funded and publicly-floated frrms. 
Instead, the brewing subsegment was chosen because a rather homogeneous set of 
12 In addition, the time period has to be sufficiently long to allow for a statistically 
meaningful analysis . The time period of analysis for this paper, 1980 to 1990, was 
chosen for two reasons . First, to minimize my demands on 3i, identification of 3i' s 
largest investments was accomplished using its mainframe computer. This database 
was begun in the late 1970s, and the percentage of companies whose records had been 
computerized as of 1975, 1980 and 1985 was 1 %, 51 % and 64 %. Second, as I 
needed access to the actual fmancial statements of its investee companies , again to 
minimize my demands on 3i, I relied upon Companies House, the government agency 
with which limited liability companies must file their annual fmancial statements. 
Companies House only has financial statements from the mid to late 1970s (in 
addition, because Companies House charges a fee for providing such infonnation, the 
period of analysis was limited due to fmancial constraints). 
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TABLE 3 
Food, Drink & Tobacco (FD&T) and Brewery Investments 
..illQ.. 1960 1970 1980 1990 
3i-Funded FD&T Clients as 
a % of its Investment Ponfolio 3.0 % 6.0 % 2.1 % 3. 8 % 4.2% 
Breweries as a % of 3i FD&T Clients 38.5 % 64.2% 
Market Value of Publicly-Aoated 
Brewery and Distillery Securities 
as a % of the Market Value 
of all Listed Securities 2. 1% 4. 1 % 2. 1% 1.6 % 3.4 % 
NOles: 3i-funded FD&T clients as a percentage of its investment portfo(jo is based on the amount invested in both debt and equity 
securities. 3i breweries as a percentage of FD&T clienlS is calculated by dividing the number of breweries by the number of 
FD&T clients in its portfolio. The market value of publicly-fioated securities includes aD listed domestic debt and equity 
securities , including U.K. government debt secu rities. 
Sources: 3i data from the 3i ' s Annual Report aDd AccounLS for the respective years and its computer database. Pu blic market data from 
The Slock Exchange Official Year-Book, 1952. Volume J, pg. 1791 ~ The Stock Exchange OjJic;al Year-Book. 1960. Volume 1 , 
pg. 1669; 1hL Slock Exchange Official Yeor·Book, 1970, pg. 2692; 11Ie Slock Exchange FacI Book, March 1980, pg. 2 and 
Quality of Markets Quarterly Review, January-March 1990, pg . 30. 
public and 3i companies could be identified. 
Brewing is an interesting industry for empirical analysis for two reasons . First, both 
the public capital markets and 3i have been active in this industry for an extended 
period of time and as such both should be "infonned" investors , thus minimizing 
infonnational asymrnetries (see TABLE 3).'3 Second, the brewing industry faced 
changing dynamics during the 1980s. These dynamics included decreased 
consumption , rationalization and government competitive inquiries . From 1979 to 
1990 per capita consumption fell 11 % while production fell 13 % (Gourvish and 
Wilson forthcoming: 582, Table 14.1). As demand fell, rationalization increased. 
Between 1980 and 1986 the number of breweries declined by 16 % to 68 (Gourvish 
and Wilson forthcoming: 587). Improvement in productivity was even more 
noteworthy. The workforce declined by 34 % during the six-year period, and net 
output per employee increased 33 % (Gourvish and Wilson forthcoming: 587) . While 
13 It could be argued that infonnational asymmetries are a key cause of short-
teonism. But due to fmancial constraints , an analysis of a relatively "new" industry , 
such as electronics , could not be undertaken. 
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facing poor market conditions, the brewing industry also faced increased regulatory 
activity . Between 1966 and 1986 there were no fewer than fifteen investigations 
conducted by various government agencies, but Gourvish and Wilson concluded, 
"[Industry] change stemmed more from a variety of market forces than from 
government intervention" (Gourvish and Wilson forthcoming: 596). But a fmal 
report issued by The Monopolies and Merger Commission in 1989 (parliamentary 
Paper Crnnd 651) will result in a radical reform of the industry's vertically integrated 
structure. The MMC, believing the tied house tradition of the British brewing 
industry is a ' complex monopoly' (Crnnd 651 : 4) , has recommended Britain's largest 
vertically-integrated brewers divest a part of their public houses . The result of the 
events of the 1980s is best summarized by Gourvish and Wilson. 
For two centuries brewing for retail sale was an important investment and an 
occupation for gentlemen; now, like publishing, which in some ways it resembles , it 
has been transformed by mergers and market change, and is dominated by 
accountants, business strategists and management consultants (Gourvish and Wilson 
forthcoming : 596). 
The sum of these dynamics makes the brewing industry particularly interesting for an 
empirical analysis of the short-termism debate, for both Porter and Reich (1982) have 
argued, because of the short-term focus of capital markets, investors are unwilling to 
allocate funds to those industries which are undergoing fundamental change and which 
require external capital. The Macmillan Committee made similar accusations in 1931 ; 
it was Britain' s highly efficient and impersonal capital markets which did not provide 
sufficient support to the steel and shipbuilding industries . 
A search of 3i's investment portfolio yielded two 3i-funded brewery-related ftrms with 
1980 turnover greater than £5 million. In order to select publicly-floated brewing 
companies, Lotus Private+ database was utilized. Again, the minimum turnover 
selection criteria was £5 million. The upper limit for turnover was set arbitrarily at 
£20 million, primarily because the largest 3i fmn had turnover of £12.9 million in 
1980. These parameters initially yielded ten companies but ftve were eliminated 
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because they had activities in unrelated industries . The two 3i firms had average 
turnover and net income of £10.4 and £0.6 million in 1980 as compared to £14.7 and 
£1.1 million for the five public firms (see APPENDIX A and APPENDIX B for all 
fmancial data; code names have been used for 3i firms for confidentiality purposes). 
The selection process and data employed introduces several sources of bias which 
could affect the outcome of the analysis . First, the analysis includes only those 
companies which survived the period of analysis . Survival is not an issue for the 3i 
database as it includes all fums which 3i had made an investment as of 1980, even if 
at 1990 they were no longer fmanced by 3i or had ceased trading . The search yielded 
two 3i-funded companies for the period 1980 to 1990, and they both have been 
included in the analysis . 14 The Lotus database includes all active publicly-floated 
firms as of a terminal date. For example, all fums which filed fmancial statements 
in 1990 or 1991 (depending on the month of fiscal year end) are included. Thus a 
"backwards" search to 1980 would include only those firms which were trading in 
1990/1. It may be the case that breweries ceased trading prior to 199011 , and thus 
were not included in the database (the database does include furns which were subject 
to a private buyout and so indicates; no such fums were identified) . Performance 
results might be overstated if there were publicly-floated fums which ceased trading . 
The second source of bias relates to the data analyzed -- accounting data. Such data 
is subject to accounting practices and rules. The most serious source of bias relates 
to asset reappraisals . British fums periodically reappraise fixed assets and adjust 
balance sheet valuations accordingly . All firms included in the analysis , both public 
and 3i, revalued their fixed assets at least once during the eleven year period. An 
analysis of the revaluations reveal significant differences in the number and size of 
revaluations . 3i companies revalued just once with an average write-up of 41 %. 
14 As 3i ' s database included only 51 % of its investments as of 1980, the sample 
may not include all 3i-funded breweries. This source of bias is mitigated by the fact 
that 3i computerised the data of its largest investments first. 
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Finn 
A. 3i-FUNDED FIRMS 
TABLE 4 
Asset Reappraisals 
Year of Asset 
Reappraisal 
Alpha Company (Brewer/Public House Operator) 1981 
Zeta Company (Maltster) 1990 
B. PUBLICLY -FLOATED FIRMS 
Bunonwood Brewery plc 1982 
1987 
1990 
Fuller, Smith & Turner, plc 1983 
1986 
1990 
Hardys & Hansons plc 1981 
Josepb Holt plc 1984 
1989 
Young & Co.'s Brewery plc 1981 
1987 
Percentage 
Reappraisal 
52. 8 % 
29.8 % 
120.1 % 
46.0% 
32.7 % 
157.7 % 
69. 1% 
38. 5 % 
126.7 % 
66.0 % 
83.3% 
182.7 % 
79.5% 
Public companies revalued an average of two times , and each average write-up was 
91 % (see TABLE 4). These revaluations typically were real estate-related (ie, public 
houses, not manufacturing facilities) . As one of the 3i fIrms was a maltster, which 
supplies raw ingredients to breweries , and not a public house operator, 3i asset 
revaluations accordingly should be lower. In addition, 3i's food and beverage 
industrial adviser believes there are three reasons why publicly-floated fIrms may have 
a greater impetus to revalue their assets (Wood August 18, 1993). First, he believes 
public shareholders look favourably upon greater net assets per share. Second, the 
amount of the asset write-up is added to shareholders' capital which reduces leverage. 
Finally, as a result of the takeover trend of the 1980s, fIrms which were potential 
takeover targets increased asset values as a negotiating tactic. If the book value of 
assets was undervalued significantly, an acquirer, as a matter of tactics , might stress 
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the substantial "premiwn" to book value it was offering for the target fmn. 3i firms, 
on the other hand, are not required by 3i to revalue their assets, nor is it worth the 
associated costs of hiring an independent appraiser. ls 
A third source of potential bias relates to the aggregation of the accounting data. The 
financial results of each group of companies have been combined into an aggregate 3i-
funded and publicly-floated company. These aggregations have combined fmancial 
results of companies with fiscal years ending in different months . Ideally one would 
want to calculate fmancial results all based on a twelve month period ending in the 
same month. 
Finally, the most crucial source of bias relates to the influence of capital markets on 
fmn behaviour. The short-termism debate centres upon the pressures exerted by 
public capital markets . As revealed in TABLE 5, the five publicly-floated firms have 
been public for an extended period of time and have significant family involvement, 
thus one may question if these fmns are influenced by investors to the same extent as 
recently floated fmns .16 
Financial Perjonnance. Financial analysis reveals 3i fmns exhibited superior 
turnover growth. Average turnover growth was 8.6% per annwn while public fmns 
experienced a 3.7% growth rate . Real net income growth was -0.3 % for 3i 
IS With the current recession and the MMC report of 1989 requiring the large 
vertically integrated breweries to reduce their nwnber of tied houses, public house 
valuations have fallen. Accounting rules require losses associated with the sale of 
public houses to be recognized in the income statement. As a result, many pubJicly-
floated brewers are now reducing the value of their fixed assets in one adjustment 
rather than having to recognize losses as individual public houses are divested. 
Obviously, this points to the pitfalls of an empirical analysis based on accounting data. 
16 An additional issue may be the extent of ownership by family or management. 
A very general shareholder profLIe is included in TABLE 5. More detailed 
shareholder information is available from Companies House, but because of fmancial 
constraints I have not attempted such a shareholder analysis. 
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TABLE 5 
Capitalization and Shareholder Profile 
Finn 
Burtonwood Brewery plc 
Fuller. Smith & Turner. plc 
Hardys & Hansons plc 
Joseph Holt plc 
Young & Co.·s Brewery plc 
Founded 
1867 
1845 
Not 
Available 
1849 
Not 
Available 
Registered .s 
Public Company 
1964 
1929 
1897 
1951 
1890 
Notes: OL - Officially Listed; USM - Unlisted Securities Market 
Equity Securities 
Ordinary (Ol) 
-24.8 % held by Directors & Family 
-19.7 % held by Institutional 5% Holders 
4 .9% Preference (Ol) 
-18.2% held by Directors & Family 
Ordinary A (USM) 
-29.0% held by Directors 
-9.8 % held by Whitbred & Co. 
Ordinary B 
-35.6 % held by Directors 
4.2 % Preference (Ol ) 
8.0% Preference 
Ordinary (Ol) 
-15.6% held by Institutional 5% Holders 
-9 .3% held by Whitbred Investment Co. 
5 % Preference 
6 % Preference 
Ordinary (Ol ) 
-56 .4 % held by Directors & Family 
-5.8 % held by Institutional 5% Holders 
Ordinary A 
-13.6% held by Institutional 5% Holders 
Ordinary B 
-Privately held 
Non-voting Ordinary (Ol) 
4.2 % Preference (Ol) 
9.0% Preference (OL) 
Institutional S% Holders indicates percentage of shares outstanding held by instirutions with a 5% or larger holding . 
Source: The In~man·onal Slock Exchange. Official Yearbook 1989-1990 
companies as compared to 8.6 % for public companies (see TABLE 6) . The average 
turnover growth rate of 8.6% for 3i companies compares to a 3.8 % average growth 
rate for the four largest publicly-floated brewery and public house operators (Allied-
Lyons, Bass, Scottish & Newcastle and Whitbread) . The average net income growth 
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TABLE 6 
Comparative Finaociai Statistics 
__ 3i_ Public __ 3i_ ~ 
1980 Average: 
Turnover £10.4 mln £14.7 mln Leverage: 
Net Income £ 0.6 mln £ 1.1 mln LT Debt/Equity I 32.9 %· 6.2% 
ST + LT Debt/Equityl.' 90.3%· 8.5% 
Average Growth Rate: 
Turnover' 8.6%· 3.7% Casb as a % of: 
Net Income' (0.3)% 8.6% Current Assets' 1.7%· 42.3% 
Turnover' 0.8%· 12.6% 
Average Margin: 
Gross Profit' 21.0%· 60.8% Pixed Assets as a % 
Operating Income' 5.7%· 15.3% of Turnover': 30.3%· 127.7% 
Net Income' 4.4 %· 8.5% 
A verage Rerum: 
Return on Assets2 ,4 7.3% 7.0% 
Rerum on Equityl 12.2%· 7.0% 
NOlel: ST - Short Term; LT - Long Term. Averages are arithmetic averages of annual levels or year over year growth rates as 
appropriate. Growth rates are based on Teal levels which have been calculated using a GDP at market prices deOator. 
• Indicates Lhat the 3i and public company figures are statistically different at the 2 % error level (average turnover growth rate 
at the 10% error level and rerum on equity at the 5% error level). 
I 1980 10 1990 1 1983 to 1990 ) 1984 to 1990 of Rerum on AsseIs = Operating lncomefEnd of Period Assets 
S Short term debt includes bank overdrafts 
rate for these four companies was 10.0 %. 
3i firms had noticeably lower margins . The lower net margin can be partially 
explained by greater interest expenditures as 3i flnns are more highly leveraged with 
a long-term debt to shareholders' capital ratio of 32.9 % as compared to 6.2 % for 
public companies . If short-term debt, including bank overdrafts , is included, 3i fmns 
appear even more leveraged with a total debt to equity ratio of 90 .3 % as compared 
to 8.5 %. 11 The lower operating margins can also be attributed partially to greater 
17 Due to the differences in the magnitudes of the asset reappraisals, 3i fixed assets 
may remain undervalued as compared to public companies thus creating the illusion 
3i fmns are less leveraged. As a result of the reappraisals listed in TABLE 4, public 
company assets would be increased in value approximately 259 % more than 3i fixed 
assets . Adjusting shareholders ' capital for this difference produces long-term debt and 
total debt to shareholders ' capital ratios of 12.7 % and 34.9 %. This adjustment may 
be too large, however, for one of the 3i fmns was not real-estate intensive and in 
addition the level of capital expenditures for 3i companies was greater than public 
27 
leverage as interest expenditures related to bank overdrafts (3i fInns rely on such 
overdrafts to a greater extent than public fInns as evidenced by the much higher total 
debt to equity ratio) are not reported separately but are included in operating 
expenditures . Finally, gross margins are lower because one of the 3i-fmus is a 
maltster rather than a pubLic house operator. Public houses typically have higher gross 
margins due to greater associated overhead costs (Wood August L8, 1993). 
Although 3i fmus have lower profIt margins, it appears they may employ and utilize 
capital more effectively. Cash as a percentage of current assets and as a percentage 
of turnover (which is not subject to distortion by asset revaluations) averaged 1.7% 
and 0.8% for 3i firms and 42.3% and 12.6% for public firms . It also appears 3i 
fInns may utilize fIxed assets more effectively. Fixed assets as a percentage of 
turnover averaged 30.3 % for 3i fIrms (52.2 % excluding the maltster) as compared to 
127.7% for public firms. IS Finally, although 3i firms have lower margins, because 
they are more leveraged and may utilize fIxed assets more effectively, their return on 
capital is slightly greater. Return on assets was 7 .3% for 3i fmus and 7.0 % for 
public fIrms ; return on equity was superior as well, 12.2% for 3i finns and 7 .0 % for 
public flfIllS . 
Tangible Investment. Porter (1993) evaluates capital allocation in tenus of an external 
capital market and an internal capital market, and this framework will be utilized in 
this paper as well. If Porter and Reich's capital commitment argument mentioned 
earlier is true then one would expect differences in the commitment of funds to the 
brewing industry during the 1980s. The U.K. facts do not necessarily support their 
argument. Only one flfIll had a large equity floatation, and this fInn was the publicly-
companies during the 1980 to 1990 period -- 3i balance sheets ex ante may have been 
more accurately valued. 
IS Again, this measurement is dependent upon balance sheet reappraisals discussed 
previously. Adjusting 3i fIxed assets for this difference yields a fIxed assets to 
turnover ratio of 78.5 % -- still superior to the ratio for public firms of 127.7 % . 
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floated Burtonwood Brewery (see APPENDIX B). Importantly, an examination of its 
operating results reveals its perfonnance was not particularly superior to the public 
company average; average sales and net income growth rates were 4.3% and 5.4% 
as compared to 3.7% and 8.6 % for the aggregate five public companies. 19 Thus it 
appears the capital markets were willing to commit equity to an average performer in 
an industry experiencing substantial change. 
With regard to the internal "capital market", 3i companies committed a greater 
proportion of their funds to fiXed assets. Fixed asset investment represented 63.0% 
of total funds generated as compared to 46.3 % for public companies (see Section A 
of TABLE 7) . Fazzari, Hubbard and Peters en (1988) in an analysis of publicly-
floated D.S. firms found capital expenditures exhibited virtually no relationship with 
cash flow for larger firms , whereas they found a strong correlation for smaller frrms . 
In addition, they found smaller firms relied to a greater extent upon internally 
generated cash. They concluded investment decisions for smaller frrms may be 
dependent upon and negatively affected by fluctuations in cash flow. A similar 
analysis of 3i and public firms yields similar interesting results . 
Capital expenditures exhibited a very small correlation with internally generated funds 
for 3i firms but a 0.70 correlation for publicly-floated firms (see Section B of TABLE 
7). On the other hand, including externally raised funds yields a correlation between 
19 Nor was performance following the equity issuance in 1986 particularly robust 
as compared to public companies. · 
Comparative Growth Rates 
Burtonwood Turnover 
Aggregate Turnover 
Burtonwood Net Income 
Aggregate Net Income 
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1980-86 
6.4 % 
4.8 
2.6 
8.5 
1987-90 
1.1% 
2.0 
9.6 
8.7 
TABLE 7 
Fixed Asset Invesanent 
A. SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS 
~i Public 3i 
Sources of Funds: Uses of Funds: 
Operations 80.0% 87.3% Fixed Assets 63.0 % 
Debt 19.2 7.3 Dividends 3.5 
Equity 0. 1 1.3 Taxes 16.7 
Other 0.7 4.0 Working Capital 5.6 
Total 100.0% 100.0 % Other 11.3 
Total 100.0 % 
B. CORRELA nON COEFFICIENTS WTI1! RESPECT TO FIXED ASSET INVESlMENT 
__ 3i_ 
Funds from Operations 
Number of Observations 
Total Sources of Funds 
Number of Observations 
0.15 
11 
0.86 
11 
C. LOG GROSS PROFIT REGRESSED ON LOG FIXED ASSET INVESlMENT (fA) 
~ ~ Time ObservatiQ!J!i 
3i 0.06 0.10 0.04 8 
1.82' 2.99' 6.39' 
Public -0.57 -0.25 0 . 12 7 
-1l.96 ·0.44 1.44 
D. LOG RETURN ON EQUITY REGRESSED ON LOG FIXED ASSET !NVESlMENT (fA) 
~ ~ Time Observations 
3i 0.52 0.48 -0.17 9 
3.002 2.97' -6.55' 
Public 0.30 -0.06 -0.04 9 
1.51 ·0.36 ·2.09' 
Public 
0.70 
11 
-0.13 
11 
~ 
1.9 
2.9 
~ 
2. 1 
1.9 
Public 
46.3% 
13.9 
23.6 
8.6 
7.5 
100.0% 
--1L 
0.97 
-0.13 
--1L 
0.85 
0.16 
Notes: Method of estimation for Sections C and 0 is OLS . Constant tenns are not reported. T·statistics are reported under coefficients. 
I Significant at 1 % 2 Significant at 5% J Significant at 10% • Significant at 13 % 
fixed asset investment and total sources of funds of 0.86 for 3i finns and -0.13 for 
public finns . These results are in line with the findings of Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Peters en (1988) -- publicly-floated British finns may be equally constrained in their 
investment decisions as publicly-floated U.S. finns. 
A regression of lagged fixed asset investment on gross profit (which is not subject to 
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distorting influence of asset revaluations) indicates that for 3i firms a 10% increase in 
such investment results in a 0.6 % increase in gross profit in the year following 
investment and 1.0% in the subsequent year; there appears to be no relationship for 
public firms as the coefficients of the independent variables are insignificant (and 
negative) and the r is quite low (see Section C of TABLE 7). It also appears fixed 
asset investment has a lagged association with return on equity. A 1 % increase in 
fixed asset investment is associated with a 0.52 % increase in return on equity in the 
year following investment for 3i finns and a 0.48 % increase in the subsequent year; 
public fmns do not exhibit a similar statistically significant relationship -- the first year 
is positive and the second year is negative (see Sections D of TABLE 7).20 
The correlation and regression evidence seems to indicate 3i finns budget fixed asset 
investment not based on simply the amount of internally generated capital but rather 
based on the expected returns from such investment. Any shortfall in required funds 
is obtained from external sources . The lower levels of cash and greater leverage may 
force 3i fmns to be more conscious of their capital budgeting decisions. PubJicly-
floated fmns , on the other hand, simply may budget fixed asset investment based on 
internally generated funds (which may constrain such investment) without regard to 
subsequent profitability. 
Intangible Investment. Central to the short-termism argument is the vulnerability of 
intangible investments, that is expenditures which are expensed in the period incurred 
rather than being capitalized. These intangible investments include activities which 
commonly are reported in fmancial statements such as research and development, and 
activities which are not reported separately in financial statements, such as advertising 
and employee training. Porter has argued because capital markets are so keenly 
focused on short-tenn profits , when turnover is down or profits do not appear that 
20 Although shareholders ' capital may not be stated correctly due to asset 
revaluations, the important point is not necessarily the magnitude of the coefficients 
but rather the statistically significant association between fixed asset investment and 
subsequent profits . 
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they will meet estimates projected by securities finns, public companies intentionally 
reduce intangible investments to meet expectations . But in the process of meeting 
short-tenn profit forecasts , the long-tenn viability of the finn is hanned. 
Without disclosure of these intangible expenditures by either public or 3i companies 
this is a difficult argument to anal yze empirical I y. A simple response to this argument 
would be to point to the lower margins of 3i companies; this might indicate they spend 
more on longer tenn intangible investments . But this does not answer if there is true 
long-tenn benefit from such expenditures , nor does it address the accusation that 
public companies sacrifice these investments for the sake of current profits . This 
paper has attempted an empirical analysis of Porter' s argument. 
The first step of the argument is to posit capital markets do not like surprises --
witness the 46 % drop in Medeva plc' s share price on July 20, 1993 when it 
announced profits would be approximately 20 % below expectations (Financial Times 
July 20, 1993). Security analysts often project profits based on expected turnover. 
If turnover is projected to increase, profits should move in some similar relationship 
and if turnover is projected to be flat or down then profits will be expected to react 
accordingly . Without the pressures of securities analysts , 3i fInns are not held to the 
same degree of predictability; if sales are down intangible investments can be treated 
as fixed costs -- not subject to short-tenn manipulation. A simple correlation analysis 
of 3i-funded and publicly-floated firms supports this argument (see Section A of 
TABLE 8). While the correlation between gross profit and turnover is not strong for 
public firms , a correlation coefficient of 0.97 at the operating income and net income 
levels indicates public ftnns are able to provide a predictable relationship between 
turnover and profits; 3i finns' operating profit and net income exhibit a correlation of 
0.55 and -0.48 with turnover. 
The second step of the empirical analysis is to imagine turnover fitted against a time 
trend. There are periods when turnover is buoyant and is above trend and periods 
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TABLE 8 
Intangible Investment 
3i 
A. CORRELA nON COEFFICIENTS WTIll RESPECT TO TIJRNOVER 
Gross Profit 
Number of Observations 
Operating Income 
Number of Observations 
Net income 
Number of Observations 
0.98' 
0.55 
-0.482 
Public 
0.41 
0.97' 
0.97 ' 
8. CORRELA n ON COEFFICIENTS OF RESIDUALS WTIll RESPECT TO FITTED TIJRNOVER RESIDUALS 
Costs of Goods Sold 
Number of Observations 
Operating Expenses 
Number of Observations 
0.88' 
-0.01 
0.33 
0.742 
Notes: Operating expenses exclude depreciation charges. The statistical significance of the correlation coefficients can be determined 
by regressing each of the variables against turnover as the estimated regression coefficient is directly related to the correlation 
coefficient (they differ by only a multiplicative constant). The statistical significance of the regression coefficients is as follows: 
I Significant at 1 % 2 Significant at S% . 
when turnover is below trend.21 One can imagine a similar trend line for 
manufacturing costs and operating expenditures , with manufacturing costs moving in 
close parallel with turnover (assuming there are no severe economic shocks) . On the 
other hand, operating expenses might be subject to short-term manipulation. Thus one 
can imagine for public firms the residuals of actual operating expenditures fitted 
against a time trend to move in tandem with turnover residuals -- when turnover is 
above trend, discretionary operating expenses are increased and when turnover is 
below trend discretionary expenses are reduced . For 3i fmns on the other hand , not 
concerned with short-term profits , the correlation between turnover and expense 
residuals should exhibit little or no relation . Section B of TABLE 8 reports the results 
of analysing the residuals of fitted time trends for real turnover against costs of goods 
2) Real turnover for both 3i-funded and publicly-floated fmns has been regressed 
against a time trend utilizing an equation of the type tnT, = tnao + a1 t + e, where T 
is turnover and t is time. The t-statistics for the a) coefficients were 11.8 (3i) and 
13.8 (public) indicating both groups of fmns demonstrated equally stable turnover (not 
digressing significantly from trend) . 
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sold and operating expenses .22 As hypothesized there is essentially no correlation 
between turnover and operating expense residuals for 3i-funded companies (-0 .01) and 
a strong correlation for public companies (0 .74) . 'This might indicate public fInns are 
able to increase intangible investment during upturns and still meet profit expectations, 
but during downturns intangible investment is reduced, whereas 3i ftnns treat these 
intangible investments as fixed, not compelled to manipulate them to meet short-term 
profit expectations.23 On the other hand, one might conclude this simply indicates 
publicly-floated fInns are better able to manage their operating expenses with changes 
in turnover. But recalling that 3i fInns had greater turnover growth rates , these 
intangible investments may contribute to the superior turnover growth. 
VI. Conclusion 
'This paper was motivated by the long-standing fmance capitalism debate . From 1929 
to 1931, the Macmillan Committee considered at length the weaknesses of Britain' s 
capital market-dominated fmancial system and concluded the British economy could 
benefit from establishing closer relations between finance and industry more akin to 
German fmance capitalism. As a result, an institution, 3i, was created to employ a 
British-style of fmance capitalism -- an investment approach largely the result of 3i' s 
initial Chairman and General Manager. 
In more recent years , as a result of the economic success of the bank-dominated 
economies of Japan and Germany, the fmance capitalism debate has resurfaced. The 
most recent debate has been either theoretical or rhetorical. The theoretical research 
22 Depreciation charges have been excluded from operating expenses as these 
expenses are not subject to immediate short-term manipulation by management. In a 
sense, this adjustment "magnifies" potential manipulation of discretionary intangible 
expenses. 
23 'This analysis can be criticized as turnover may not have been expected to move 
in a linear relation, and thus the residuals do not properly reflect deviations from 
projected results . But as noted earlier, a linear time trend fits the turnover 
observations equally well for both groups of firms. 
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largely has appeared in the economics literature and has been noticeably absent of 
public policy recommendations. The rhetorical arguments, on the other hand, either 
have been independently published or have appeared in the popular press and have not 
been hesitant to recommend public policy and institutional changes. The lack of 
empirical support places doubt on both approaches to the debate and makes public 
policy changes risky at best. 
This paper has tried to add empirical facts to the debate. Several interesting results 
were uncovered by the analysis. The most significant discovery was the superior 
turnover growth of 3i-funded companies . Faced with difficult economic and 
demographic trends during the 1980s, increasing market share, while maintaining 
acceptable returns on invested capital, may have been a more appropriate goal to that 
of reporting near term profit growth. Both the theoretical and rhetorical short-termism 
research have argued that publicly-floated firms inappropriately place short-term 
profits before long-term competitive success -- a strategy which ultimately harms a 
nation' s economic success . 
A second significant discovery was the strong correlation between internally generated 
funds and fixed asset investment for publicly-floated firms and a similar strong 
correlation for 3i-funded fmns but with total funds, including externally raised funds . 
This might indicate fixed asset investment of publicly-floated firms may be dependent 
upon and negatively affected by fluctuations in such internally generated funds . 
Recalling the evidence of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) that smaller publicly-
floated U.S. finns exhibit a similar relationship between internal funds and fixed asset 
investment, the Macmillan Gap may be a pervasive characteristic of capital-market 
dominated economies. 
A third significant discovery was the association between fixed asset investment and 
subsequent profitability for 3i-funded fmns -- an association which was noticeably 
absent for publicly-floated firms. This evidence bears heavily on the behavioural 
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aspects of the short-termism debate -- "Does public floatation lead to differing 
managerial behaviour which ultimately affects corporate and economic performance? " 
Earlier in the paper I questioned if the publicly-floated breweries truly were subject 
to short-termism behaviour as they had been publicly-floated for an extended period 
of time and had significant family ownership. Recalling the comments of 3i' s food 
and beverage industrial adviser with respect to the reasons for asset revaluations and 
the fact that the publicly-floated breweries revalued their assets to a greater extent than 
their 3i counterparts, then the decisions of the publicly-floated breweries must have 
been influenced as a result of their being publicly-floated . Unfortunately, because of 
time and fmancial constraints , this paper lacks the historian's customary weapon of 
hindsight -- only time will tell if the investment behaviour of 3i-funded finns results 
in superior long-term financial performance. 
Finally, the results should be viewed with caution. I had hoped to utilize a much 
larger set of publicly-floated and 3i-funded food, drink and tobacco companies , but 
because of fmancial constraints and teclmical problems (after monies had been spent 
to obtain data from Companies House) the analysis was narrowed to include brewery-
related companies . This paper leaves many questions related to the theoretical short-
termism model developed in this paper unanswered. But with a history of funding 
both small and large firms for more than 45 years , 3i presents the unique opportunity 
for further empirical analysis, and it is only through further empirical analysis that 
short-termism can be better understood and that potential public policy and institutional 
changes can be recommended. As Professor A.C. Pigou stated, " . .. without facts we 
can do nothing: but with facts , until they have been passed through the mill of 
thought and their lessons educed from them by reason, we can still do nothing." 
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TABLE g 
Intangible Inveslment 
3i 
A. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS Wl11l RESPECT TO TURNOVER 
Gross Profit 
Number of Observations 
Operating Income 
Number of Observations 
Net income 
Number of Observations 
0.981 
0.55 
-0.482 
Public 
0.41 
0.97 1 
0.97 1 
B. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF RESIDUALS Wl11l RESPECT TO FfITED TURNOVER RESIDUALS 
Costs of Goods Sold 
Number of Observations 
Operating Expenses 
Number of Observations 
0.881 
-0.01 
0.33 
0.742 
NO'ts: Operating expenses exclude depreciation charges . The statistical significance of the correlation coefficients can be detemUned 
by regressing each of the variables against turnover as the estimated regression coefficient is directly related to the correlation 
coefficient (they differ by only a multiplicative constant). The statistical significance of lhe regression coefficienLS is as follows: 
I Significant at I i) 2 Significant at 5% . 
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Appendix A 
Financial Data 
3i-Funded Companies 
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w 
\0 
Consol idated 3 i Funded Corrpan,es 
(pounds in thousands) 
OPERATING STATISTICS: 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average Std Dev Coef Var 
Gross Margin 
EBlTDA Margin 
Operatin9 Margin 
Net MargIn 
BALANCE SHEET: 
~~T D~bW~~g/Equi ty 
Cash/Turnover 
Cash/Current Assets 
Fixed Assets/Turnover 
Operlting Income/Assets 
Het Income/Equl ty 
COST OF CAPITAL: 
ST + LT Debt 
less: Zeta COO'fJany* 
Net Debt 
Interest 
less: Zeta COfTl>any· 
Net I nteres t 
Effective Interest Rate 
Equity 
DIvidend 
Effect l v. Div i dend Rate 
REAL VALUES : 
GOP at "arket Prices 
Turnover 
Growth Rate 
Cost of Goods Sold 
Operating Income 
Gro •• Prof I t ' EBITOA 
Net Income 
Growth Rate 
Fixed Asset Investment 
Funds from Operations 
Total Sources of Funds 
NA 
NA 
NA 
6 . 0% 
45.6% 
109.5% 
0.4% 
0.7% 
24.6% 
NA 
18.8% 
NA 
NA 
NA 
8.6% 
37 . 0% 
67.5% 
0.4% 
1.0% 
32 . 9% 
NA 
20.8% 
NA 
NA 
NA 
7.8% 
27.0X 
70.4X 
0.3X 
0.7% 
31.6% 
NA 
18. 0X 
22.0% 
8.6% 
7.0X 
6.0% 
15.2X 
95.6% 
0.6% 
1.1X 
28.3% 
8.1% 
15.8X 
20.6% 
7 . 2% 
5.6% 
4.0% 
13.6% 
73.9% 
0.5% 
1.2% 
24.8% 
7.7% 
l1.5X 
21.2% 
6 . 8% 
5.0% 
2.8% 
12.5X 
57.3% 
0.6% 
1.7% 
26.1% 
7.6% 
8.1X 
21.9% 
7 .4% 
5 . 5% 
2 . 8% 
18 . 5% 
47.4% 
0.9% 
2 . 3% 
28 . 9% 
7.8% 
7. 5X 
21.1% 
7 . 7% 
5.7% 
3.1% 
49.7% 
89.6% 
0.7% 
1.7% 
35.4% 
6.8% 
9.3X 
20.7% 
9.1% 
7.1% 
3.2% 
41.8X 
101.4% 
0 . 9% 
2 . 2% 
31 . 3% 
9 . 2% 
10.3X 
21.8X 
7.3:0: 
5.4% 
2.4% 
48 . 0% 
129.8% 
1.4% 
2 . 7% 
34.6X 
6.1% 
7.8% 
19 . 9:0: 
6 . 5% 
4.5% 
2.0% 
53.2% 
150.9% 
1.5:0: 
3.2:0: 
35.2% 
5.2X 
6.9% 
7,226 6,645 8,360 13,312 11,475 9,578 8,585 17,321 21,681 30,308 37,489 
4,390 3,168 5,298 9,516 7,189 4,860 3,20011,69414,81919,20223,129 
----- ------_. ---- -_.- --_._ ... --. __ ........ _ .. ----_. _- .-.----- - ------- -------- -_ .- --- -
===~~~~~ .-=~~~~~ = .. ~~2~~ .. =~~~~~ ••• ~~~~ .==~~~!~ = .. ~~~~~ =.=~~~~~ ===~~~~ ==!!~!~~ .. !~~~~~ 
837 
493 
986 
530 
885 
448 
1,037 
720 
421 
48 
450 
80 
647 
83 
1,051 
454 
1,304 
688 
1,548 
576 
2,451 
827 
=.=.=~:: =.= •• ~~~ ..... :~~ .= ... ~!~ == ••• ~~ .=.=.~~~ 564 -= ... ~~~ .... =~!~ == ... ~~~ ===!~~~~ 
12.1X 13.1:0: 14 . 3:0: 8.4% 8.7% 7. 8% 10 . 5X 10.6% 9.0X 8.8% 11.3:0: 
6,6~ 
1.2% 
100.0 
20,806 
NA 
HA 
NA 
1,238 
1,466 
1,636 
1,842 
9,849 
89 
0 . 9% 
111.3 
21,444 
3.1% 
NA 
NA 
HA 
1 ~g~r% 
U~~ 
2,375 
11,~~~ 
1.1X 
119.8 
22,865 
6 . 6% 
NA 
NA 
HA 
1,781 
· 3 . 1X 
1,063 
2,294 
2,275 
13,924 
127 
0.9% 
126.1 
29~Vl% 
22,762 
2,048 
3,891 
1,746 
'2.0% 
1,567 
~:m 
15,518 
133 
0.9% 
131.9 
33\~~~ 
26,801 
1,882 
4,519 
~~~~~% 
993 
~:m 
16 , 718 
151 
0.9% 
139.5 
34,530 
2.3% 
27,220 
1,741 
4,968 
966 
' 28.8% 
1,736 
2,087 
2,098 
18,099 
151 
0.8% 
144.4 
33,386 
'3.3% 
2~,m 
(846 
934 
· 3.2% 
1,483 
~:m 
19,339 
151 
0 . 8% 
151 . 5 
37\~?~% 
29,832 
2,136 
5,077 
l~l~~% 
UPo 
6,407 
21,388 
211 
1.0X 
161.5 
42\E~% 
33,774 
3,008 
4,911 
1\~~~% 
1,306 
~:m 
23'm 
0.9% 
172.9 
43,225 
1.5% 
33 , 817 
2,324 
6,248 
~~g~~% 
2,796 
2,361 
3,152 
24,841 
214 
0.9% 
183.7 
45,988 
6.4% 
36,820 
2,071 
6,~gg 
,11.3% 
1,257 
2,031 
1,324 
• ZeU C~any does not provide interest expense related to all of its outstanding debt, thus it has been eliminated. 
21.0% 
7 . 6% 
5.7% 
4.4% 
32.9% 
90.3% 
0.8% 
1.7% 
30.3% 
7.3% 
12.2% 
10.4% 
0.9% 
8.6% 
'0.3% 
0.6% 
0.8% 
0 . 8% 
2 . 2% 
15.3% 
30 . 8% 
0.4% 
0.8% 
3.9% 
1.2% 
4.9% 
2.0% 
0.1% 
0.03 
0.11 
0.15 
0 . 49 
0.46 
0 . 34 
0.49 
0.46 
0 . 13 
0 . 16 
0 .40 
0.19 
0.11 
8.5% 0.99 
22.9% (67.96) 
Consol idated 3i Funded Corrpanies 
(pounds in thous ands) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Ye.r End HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA NA HA NA 
I HCOME STATEMENT : 
Turnover 20,806 23,867 27,392 36,785 44,511 48,169 48,210 ~§:m ~~:m §~:m tr:~~g COGS NA NA NA 28,703 35,350 37,972 37,650 Gross Prof i t NA NA NA 8,082 9,161 10,197 10,560 12,075 14,218 l~:m 'N~~ ~8fTDAhtion NA NA NA 593 719 839 894 2:m 1,429 NA NA NA 3,176 3,201 ~:m 3,563 ~:m tm r~~ Operating Income NA HA NA 2,583 2,482 2,~~ ~:m Interest 837 986 885 1,037 421 450 ~:~8~ 1,548 2:451 Net Income ,,2~~ 2,045 2,134 2,202 
"m "m 1,349 l,m l,m "m oeclared Dividend 89 127 127 151 211 
BALANCE SHEET : 
Cash 75 92 91 223 240 300 427 420 652 
,Ul8 11:m Debtors 2,734 1,912 1~:~8~ 1~:~~ l~:m l~:m l~:m l~:m 28:m Inventory 7,687 7,653 25,091 27,438 
Current Assets 10,496 9,657 13,158 19,447 19,268 17,418 18,410 25,294 29,382 37,470 39,908 
Ft xed Assets 5,m U~~ 8,650 10,424 '1:m l~:m '~:m 2~:~g~ 21:~~~ 2~:m 29,709 Investments 1,396 l,m 2,94~ Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Toul Assets .!~:.~~! 18,649 .~~~~2: 31,n4 32,228 .~~!~~~ 34,423 .~!~~~~ 52,859 a~~~~~ :r~~~~ ....... = 
.l>-Q Credt tors 1,502 l:~~~ 2,081 l~:m 4,431 U~ ~:m U~~ 1~:~~ 18:m 2~:m ST O.bt 4,215 5'l~~ 9,m Other 444 336 453 840 342 583 599 442 185 
Curr.nt Lfabflltl.s 6,161 4,931 7,838 15,346 14,213 12,632 12,287 17,827 21,242 30,043 33,363 
LT O.bt 3,011 3'~8 3,212 2,122 2'l~ 2,095 3,357 9'~~l ~:~~~ 11,198 1~:m Oth.r 289 271 382 587 680 2~:m Equity 6,600 9,849 11,883 13,924 15,518 16,718 18,099 19,339 21,388 24,841 
Totol Liabilities & Equity =!~~~~! 18,649 .~~!~2~ a!!::~~ z~~!~~~ .~~~2~~ .~!!!~~ .:!~~~~ 52,859 .~~~~~ .~!~~ ....... 
STATEMENT OF FUNDS: Tolol X Sources of Funds : 
Operations 1, 638 2,2~~ 2,748 2,~~~ 2,869 2,9H 3,028 3,60~ 4, 838 4,08~ 3,73~ 34,~~~ 80.0X Other 0 69 0.7X Debt 206 298 (22) 1,22b (111) (18) I ,42~ 6,O~ (856) 1,3~ <1,299) 8,321 19. 2X Equity 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 64 O.IX 
-- -- --- - --- ---- -
Total Sources of Funds 1,842 2,643 2,726 4,252 2,822 2,927 4,526 9,707 3,974 5,450 2,432 43,301 100.0X 
Use. of Fund.: 
Fixed Assets 1,4~ 1,7}t 1,2~ 1,~~~ ',m 2,422 2'1~1 5'm 2,109 4'm 2'm 2ua 63 . 0X Dividend. 133 174 3. 5X lexes 17 33 38 281 353 113> 765 409 3'OH "2~ ',m r'~~ 16.7X Other 163 0 144 924 180 44 7 2,263 11.3X \larking cspital and Cash 147 816 1,176 939 856 241 1,462 1,168 "~~ ~~~~) .. ~~~~!~) .. ~~~~!) 2:427 5.6X 
-- -- ---- ---- ----
Total Uses of Fln:ts .=!~~~ 2,643 2,726 4, 252 =:~~~~~ 2, 927 ==~~~~~ ==~~~~~ ==~#:~r~ .=~~~~~ n~!~~~ .:~~~~! 100,OX Z.===::I= IE==:==: ==::I:1:1Z.= 
~:t~~~8~~ousands) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Fiscal Yelllr End March March March March March March March March March March March 
INCOME STATEMENT: 
Turnover 7,866 8,937 10,493 11,095 13 , 01 I 1~:~~~ lU~ lb:m lU~ ~U~g ~1:m COGS HA NA HA ~:m U8~ Gross Prof i t HA HA HA 6,~~~ 6,727 7,575 8,g~ 9,395 10,576 ~:f~g~iation HA HA HA 146 176 220 231 311 403 HA HA HA 1,285 1,309 U~~ 1,569 U~1 2,000 1,380 2,090 Operating Income HA HA HA 1,139 1,133 1,~~ 1,734 1,g~~ l l m Interest 344 456 437 317 373 370 597 616 Net Income 230 665 662 807 468 436 604 657 984 225 98 Declared Dividend 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cosh 74 91 90 222 238 239 373 75 91 99 33 Debtors 1,016 759 698 790 903 881 1,212 ~:m 1,667 ~:m 2:m Inventory 1,225 1,183 1,491 1,574 1,841 1,908 2,320 3,250 
Current Assets 2,315 2, 033 2,279 2,586 2,982 3,028 3,905 4,131 5,008 5, 527 6 , 512 
Fixed Assets 2,807 ~:m 5,210 6 , 334 6,911 8,219 9,289 i:~~ I I ,531 19~~ 1~:m I nves tments 448 1,395 1,731 1,8, 2,014 2,OO~ 1,881 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets 5,570 8,116 8,884 10,651 11,792 :~~;~~1 15,196 :1~;~~~ 18,420 23,766 :~~~~!~ :=azaa: =:::::c:: ::czzz=:.::c .:.::c .. : ... ::c .. ===== .. = ::==::== :====== . ... :z== ~ 
Credi tors 864 980 1,169 1,462 1,641 1,720 2,711 2,344 ~:m ~:m 3,529 ST Debt 0 0 0 1,812 2,~~g 2'm 2,128 2,094 6,5n Other 385 255 500 321 217 459 437 279 
Current liabilities 1,249 1,235 1,669 3 , 595 4, 253 5, 171 5,056 4,897 5, 776 7, 755 10,052 
l T Debt 2,836 3'm 3,g~~ 1,984 1,986 I'm 3,~~~ 3,533 4,256 7,085 7,857 Other 251 272 265 256 66 IS 13 Equity 1,234 3,193 3,882 4,800 5,288 5,827 6,614 7,274 8,322 8,911 8,997 
Total Li abil it i es & Equi ty 5,570 8,116 ==~~~ 10,651 11,792 .!~~~~! 15,196 z!~~~~~ .. !~~~~2 23,766 =~~~~1! ===== •• == ••••• Z:.lII ••• :::C ••• lII •• . ...... 
Sources of Funds : ToUl X 
Operations 367 599 857 959 932 995 990 1,44g 1,49~ 351 241 9,235 65,2X Other 0 56 0 0 0 0 67 0 0 123 0 .9X Debt 219 311 (9) 1,240 (98) (5) I ,44~ 112 157 1,681 (240) 4,810 33.9X Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.OX 
................................................................................ 
Total 586 966 848 2,199 834 990 2,499 1,561 1,652 2,032 14,168 100. 0X 
Uses of Funds: 8.9X 9. IX 3.6X 10.4X 5.6X 10.8X 7.0X 4.9X 9.7X 17.4X 7.5X 8.6X Fixed Assets 697 815 377 1, ISO 728 1,539 1, 148 880 1, 878 3,724 1,81~ 14,735 104.0X Dividends 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.OX Taxes 0 0 0 195 304 (Ill) 697 172 347 426 250 2,280 16. IX Other 163 0 144 336 168 36 0 48 25 482 518 1,920 1l.6X 1I0rking Cap; tal and Cosh (274) 151 327 518 (366) (474) 662 461 (590) (2,600) (2,582) (4,767) 
-33.6X 
Total 586 966 848 ==~~!~ 834 990 .. =~~~~ =.!~~~! ==!~~~~ 2,032 .!~;1~ 100.0X =====:= =:=:c • • ::I::I:=_:::C= .::c : • .::cz::c:z === •• :lII 
~~~~~nrhousands) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Fi sc al Year End March March March March March March March March March March March 
INCOME STATEMEN T: 
~~~ver 12,9~~ 14,9~~ 16,8~ ~Ugg ~~:~22 ~~:m ~~:~~ ~~:m ~~:m ~~:m ~UbJ 
Gross ~ro!lt NA NA NA 3,490 3,456 3,900 3,833 4,500 6,192 6,872 6,266 ~mg~~at l on :~:~:~ I,m I , m I m I ~~ 2 ~~ 2:m 2:m u~~ 
~~~!!~g Income 4~~ 5~a 4~~ 1,~~~ 1,3~~ 1:3~~ 1:3~~ 1: m 3'ill 2,~~~ 2'm 
~:~l!~~omgiv i dend 1,O~~ 1,3g~ 1,~~~ I'm I ,m m m I ' m I , m 1,~~~ I,m 
BALANCE SHEET : 
Cash I I I I 2 6 I 54 345 56 I 91 I 1,250 
Debtors 1, 718 1,153 1,762 3,895 4 , 495 4,689 4,523 6,149 6,711 9,344 8,885 
Inventory 6,462 6,470 9,116 12,965 11,789 9,640 9,928 14,669 17,102 21,688 23,261 
Current Assets 8,181 7,624 10,879 16,861 16,286 14,390 14,505 21 ,163 24,374 31,943 33,396 
Fixed Assets 2,309 2,907 3,440 4,090 4, III 4,332 4,666 10,404 10,009 9 , 954 12,172 
Investments I 2 I 27 39 49 56 56 56 73 79 
Other 0 0 0 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets =!2~~~! s!~~~~~ zl:~~~~ z~!!!~~ .~~~~~~ :!~~~~! z!~~~~~ z~!~~~~ 34 ,439 s~!~!r2 .!~~~~ 
~ ~Teg~~~rs 4,m d~g 5,m ~:m ~:~ ~:m ~ : ~g8 U&2 1~:m 1~ : ~* 1~:m 
Other 59 81 109 132 106 125 125 124 162 163 165 
Current Liabilities 4,912 3, 696 6, 169 11, 751 9,960 7,461 7,231 12,930 15,466 22 , 288 23,311 
~~h~~bt IPa I t~ 15g m m 1~~ m 6,gf3 ~:m t:ln ~:~~ 
E", i ty 5,366 6, 656 S,001 9,124 10,230 10,891 ",485 12, 065 13,066 14,442 15,844 
Total Liabi l i ties & E",ity 10,491 10,533 14,320 21,123 20,436 18,ITl 19,227 31,623 34,439 41,970 45,647 
== •• ,.=11: •• a.... _===a.. • •••• ,.,; _=_::r.. = .• _%:11.. . ..... ; ......• • •• z:.s:;= :===a:a. 
STATEMENT OF FUNDS: Total X 
Sources of Funds: 
m~~tlons 1,26g 1,6~ 1,89~ I,m 1,93b 1,9H 2,03~ 2 , 15~ 3,33~ 3,73~ 3,4~ 25'm SUi 
Debt (13) (13) (13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 5 ,987 (1,013) (313) (1,059) 3,511 12.1X 
E",ity 0 0 ••. •••• ~ • •..• . • ~ 64 •..•••• ~ .•.•• •• ~ ••••••. ~ 0 • .••••• ~ • •• •••• ~ 64 0.2X 
Total Source. of Funds 1,256 1,6IT 1,878 2,053 1,988 1,937 2,027 8,146 2,322 3,418 2,431 29,133 100.0X 
Uses of Ft.nds: 
Fixed Assets 769 902 896 826 582 883 1,001 4 , S36 239 I, liD 494 12,538 43 .0X 
Dividends 49 IT 95 132 123 133 151 151 174 215 214 1,514 5. 2X 
Taxes 17 33 38 86 49 96 68 237 2,664 752 892 4,934 16. 9:1: 
Other 0 0 0 588 12 106 7 2,215 0 17 6 2,953 ID. IX 
Working Capital and Cash 421 665 849 421 1,222 715 800 707 (755) 1,324 825 7,194 24.7X 
-------- - ----_ .- -- ............ . ............ - .... -- .. . --- - ...... . 
Total Uses of Funds 1,256 1, 6IT 1,878 2,053 1, 988 1,937 2,027 8,146 2,322 3,418 2,431 29,133 100.0X 
=====z= z=::=z== ======_ ==_=zz= .sz==== ==Z:I.== ZII==Z.. 1I118.==S ====88Z Z.::==== _=s.&z= ==::z::&= 
Appendix B 
Financial Data 
Publicly-Floated Companies 
43 
Conso lidated Publ i cly Floated Ccxrpanies 
(pounds in thousands) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
---- -- -- -----_.-
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average Std Dev Coef Var 
OPERATING STATISTICS: --- .. _-- --- --.-- -------- -_._ --- - ----. __ . ----- .. - ... _-- .. 
Gross Margin NA HA HA NA 57.2X 58.0X 59 . 1X 61 . 6X 61.2X 63. 8X 64.8X 60.8X 2. 7X 0.04 EBITOA Margin HA HA 14 . 5X 13.9X 13.9X 14.9X 14 . 7X 15.8X 16 . 2X 16.5X 16.6X 15.2X 1. OX 0.07 Operatin9 Margin HA HA 12 . 1X 11.4X 1'.2X 12. 1X 11.9X 12 . 4X 12.9X 13.1X 13 . IX 12.2X 0. 7X 0.05 Net Marg1n 7.4X 11 . 21: 7 . 7X 6.9X 6.8X 7.8X 7 . 9X 8.6X 8.9X 9.0X 10.1X 8.5X 1. 3X 0.15 
BALANCE SHEET : 
~~TD!bW~~g/Equity 10.5X 7. 4X 6 . 8X 4 . 5X 3.7X 6.8X 6 . 4X 5.2X 4 . 7X 6.3X 6.5X 6.2X 1.1X 0.18 13 . 4X 8 .8X 8 . 5X 5 . 8X 6. 5X 9 . 1X 9 . 0X 6.9X 6.8X 8.5X 9.6X 8 . 5% 1.2X 0.15 
Cash/Turnover 8.4X 6 . 5% 7.6X 11.9X 10. 8X 13 . 1% 13.4X 13.6% 15.6% 19.2X 18.4X 12.6X 3.9X 0.31 Cash/Curr ent Assets 33 . 0X 26.5% 31.0X 42 . 1X 39 . 2% 43.8% 43.9X 46.3X 50.2X 55.6X 54.1X 42 . 3X 8 . 8X 0.21 
F 1 xed Assets/Turnover 64 .0X 110.6X 99 .4X 121 . 4X 120.7X 114.9X 126 . 2X 162.7X 156.6X 157. 7X 170.4X 127. 7X 30 . 4X 0.24 Operating Income/Assets NA HA 9 . 2X 7. 3X 7.2X 8.0X 7. 3X 6 . 2X 6.6X 6.6X 6.2X 7.2X 0.9X 0.12 Het I ncome/Equi ty 12 . 2X ID . IX 7.6X 5.5?: 5 . 6X 6.8% 6.2X 5.2X 5.5X 5.6X 5.9X 6.9X 2.1% 0.31 
COST OF CAPITAL : 
ST + LT Debt 6.031 7'm 8,189 7,672 8,927 13,232 16,027 16,768 17,390 23,553 32,116 Interest 525 940 859 781 1, 072 'l~~x 'l~~x 1,600 1,809 3,000 Effective Interest Rate 8 . 7X 10.1X 11.5X 11.2X 8.7X 8.1X 9.2X 7.7X 9 . 3X 9.6X 1.2X 0.12 
~fv!a~rd 4un 91,039 96,758 131,252 137,524 144,923 178,686 244,403 253,888 277,340 332,891 1,832 2,088 2,454 2,881 3,301 3,834 4,376 4,833 5,581 6,509 Effective Div idend Rate 3.5X 2. 0X 2.2X 1.9X 2.1 X 2.3X 2 . 1X 1.8X 1.9X 2.0X 2.0X 2 . 2X 0 . 4X 0 . 21 
.j>. REAL VALUES : 
.j>. GOP at Market Pr 1 ees 100.0 111.3 119.8 126 . 1 131.9 139.5 144.4 151.5 161.5 172.9 183 .7 
Turnover 13,837 74,148 79,312 82,542 86,353 90,850 97 , 807 98,172 98,194 99,584 105,847 Growth Rate 0 . 4X 7. 0X 4.1X 4 . 6X 5.2X 7.7X 0.4X O. OX 1.4X 6.3X 3. 7X 2.8X 0 . 75 Cost of Goods Sold NA HA HA HA ~~:m 38,121 ~~;m ~r;m ~2;m ~~:m ~\:m Gross Profit-EBITOA HA HA HA HA 39,154 Operating Income HA HA 9 566 9,443 9,674 10,969 11,619 12,151 1~:m 13,024 13 899 Net Income 5,483 8~~'x ~;l~~x 5,707 5,880 7~g~7X 7,725 8,399 8,994 10;~~~x Growth Rate · 7 . 1X 3.0X 8.8X 8 . 7X 3 . 8% 3.2X 8.6X 19.0X 2. 22 Fixed Asset Investment 8,333 6,230 4,151 1~:m ltm lU~ ,Utl 1~:g~~ 1~:m 1~:m 12,458 FLnds from Operations 11:m l~:m 11,424 n;m Total Sources of Funds 11 , 393 12,889 12,346 16,692 18,078 17,941 16,259 22,440 
Consolidated Publi cly floated COfTllanies 
(pounds i n thousands) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
fiscal Year End NA HA HA HA NA HA 
• •••• aAa _._. __ ._ 
HA NA HA HA NA 
INCOME Sl AT EHENT : 
Turnover 73 , 837 82 , 525 95,019 104,070 12~:m l~~:i~ l~U~ l~~:m 158,589 lr~'m 194,422 COGS NA HA NA NA 61,571 l~:m Gross Prof i t NA HA NA HA 65,186 73,540 83,493 9~ ,~~~ 9~:m 109:936 ~BfT~~iatton 1,707 1, 870 l~'m 2,578 l~:m l~:m 4,033 5,899 3tnl NA HA 14,484 20,805 23)" 25,692 ~~:m Operat j ng Income NA HA 11 :460 11,906 12,764 15,298 16,772 18,405 20,514 2~, ~~8 Interest 525 811 940 859 781 1,072 1,669 l~:m lun 1,809 Net Income 5 ,483 9,236 7,360 7,196 7,758 9,901 11,151 15,554 19:694 Declared Dividend 1,574 1,832 2,088 2,454 2,881 3,301 3,834 4,376 4,833 5,581 6,509 
BALANCE SKEET: 
Cosh 6,179 5,357 7,182 12,430 12,314 18:~~~ 18,898 ~8:m 24,672 33,102 n:m Debtor. 6,072 6,729 ~:m 8,220 19:~~ 11,971 u:m 12,712 Inventory 6,482 8,147 8,853 11,265 12,140 13,133 13,725 15,673 
Current Assets 18, 733 20,233 23,165 29,503 31,405 37,829 43,009 43,590 49,184 59,539 66,202 
fhed Assets 4U~~ 91,246 94,415 126,295 137,539 145,613 17un 241,903 248,411 2i1:m 3~un I nves tment s 5,662 7,269 7,098 7,76g 8,861 10,OOg 10,893 Other 56 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets 69,517 !!~~~~ !~~~~~ 162,896 !;~~;!~ 192,303 230,735 ~~~~~~~ 308,488 342,438 409,640 ======= =.:11:.=== 
.j>. Creditors 13,795 15,256 16,646 19,440 22,707 2~:22~ 28,452 26,975 30 , 827 36,471 39,592 ST Debt 1,313 1,270 1,~~ l,~g~ 3 , 83~ 4, 608 3,95~ 5,401 6,063 10,59~ V1 Other 342 422 0 0 0 
_._aaaa 
Current liabilities 15,450 16,948 18,831 22,044 26,544 29,551 33,052 30,929 36,228 42,534 50,183 
LT Debt ~ 'm 6,721 6,546 5,865 ~'m ~:~2~ 11,427 1~'m 11,989 17,490 21,525 Other 2, 498 9~:~~ 3,735 7,570 25~:m 5,074 33~:~1 Equity 44:881 91 ,039 131,252 137: 524 144,923 178,686 244:403 2n,340 
Total Liebilities & Equity 69,517 !!;~~2~ 124,849 162,896 !~~~~!~ !~~~~~~ 230,735 ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ 342,438 ~~~~~~ a •• a=== •••• :11::& ==:11::11: ••• =.===== 
STATEMENT OF FUNDS : Totol X Sources of Funds : 
Operations 11,02~ lU~~ 13,687 15,068 16'm 19,044 20,520 23,496 26,197 30,068 3~:m 222,220 87.3X Other 27 1,460 1,372 270 1,837 241 2,622 
19:m 
4.0X Debt 618 2, 038 (65) (278) (125) 2,~ 2,069 1,84~ (178) 6,1n 3,734 7.3X Equity 0 0 0 0 3,237 0 183 3,430 1.3X 
aa.a_a_. a a • •• ••• 
Total 11,663 14,628 13,649 16,250 16,289 23,280 26,096 27,174 26,260 38,809 40,349 254,447 100.0X 
Uses of Funds: 
Fixed Assets 8,333 6,934 UPs 5,059 9,196 10,416 l~:m 19:m 12:m 1~:8~~ 2~:gg~ 1~~:~~~ 46.33X Dividends 1,440 1,650 2,144 2,560 3,000 13.9X Taxes 2,442 2,873 ~:m ~:m t:m tm 5,390 8,126 6,833 ~:m 11,225 60,137 23.6X Other 189 2,828 765 1,785 ur~ (~:m) ~U~ 7.5X Working Capital and Cash (741) 343 2,286 3,711 (1,648) 2,809 3,312 2,675 8,761 8.6X 
_._ a_ ••••••• •••• ••••• a •• 
Total =!!~~~ =!:~~~~ 13,649 16,250 .!~~~~~ .~~~~~2 26,096 .~~~!~~ =~~~~~~ 38 , 809 =~~~~!~ ~~~~~~; 100.0X zz.:z=== ====::z •• aa ••••• 
Burtonwood Brewery plc (pounds I n thousands ) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Fiscal Yeer End March March March March March March March March March March March 
INCOME STATEMENT : 
Turnover 14,597 16,429 18,295 20,051 22,245 25,287 30,460 30 , 553 u:m 35,413 40,278 IXlGS NA NA NA 12 , 470 13,615 15 , 569 19,161 16,689 ~un ~~:m Gross Prof t t NA NA NA 7,581 6,430 9 , 698 11,299 11 ,864 13,222 
ravmiatlon 264 294 344 425 548 751 893 1,594 un 1,387 U~~ ~:m ~:m u*} un 2,552 3,706 3,363 ~:2~~ 4,813 ~rltlng Ine""", 2,004 2, 955 2,490 2'm 3,426 U~ Interest 69 82 75 62 103 352 775 776 562 Met Income 1,197 1,586 1,717 1,471 I'm 2,340 1,~~~ 1 ' ~l 1'~b 2,424 3'm Declared Dividend 214 243 267 390 448 762 
BALANCE SHEET: 
Cash 569 636 ~ :m g~~ 25 42 110 219 297 340 569 Debtors 2,019 2,307 3,016 ~:m 5, 050 ~:m 2,960 3,267 3,591 Inventory 816 1, 079 1, 220 1,372 1,764 2,178 2,266 2,244 
.. ~~~~ 
CUrrent Assets 3,424 4,024 5,107 5,177 4,607 5,538 7,336 5,266 5,523 5,651 6,998 
F bed Assets U1l 6,213 ~:m 20,679 23,526 2~:n} 32 : m 47,255 48,142 5U~~ 71,845 Investments 1, 3rs 2,57~ 2,99g 4,4~ 5,139 7,Orz Other 56 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets 12,301 =!~~~! 16,130 =~~~~~~ =~!~!~~ 37,088 =~~~!~! .~~~~~ =~~~~~~ 63,040 .~~~~~~ ::;==::; ::;::;= ======-
Creditors 3 ,301 3 , 39~ 4,40g 5, 156 ~:m 5,804 6,403 5'm 6,207 7, 921 8,~~~ 51 Debt 0 0 2,14~ 2,656 479 421 
""" 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a. 
DJrrent L i abi l i t i es 3,301 3, 395 4,408 5,156 6 ,767 7,948 9,061 5,865 6,686 8,342 8,651 
LT Oebt 1,011 952 938 628 905 3,8H 4,838 6,7ag 6,66~ 7,787 12,~~* other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Equ i ty 7, 969 9, 334 10,784 22,648 23,651 25,260 29,562 44,343 45,457 46,911 .~~~~~ 
Total Liabilities' Equity .!~~~~! =!~~~! 16,130 28,632 .~!~~~! =~~~~~ =~!~~~! =~~~~~ =~~~~2~ a~~~2!2 .~~~!~~ ======= 
STATEMENT OF FUNDS: Total X SOUrces of Funds: 
2,60b ~r.t l on. 2,426 2,84~ 3 ,106 3,19g 2,972 2, 348 2,957 3,582 t:~~~ 5 , 3~ 3l'm 7~ : ~~ other 0 0 200 0 
oebt (48) (59) (14) (110) (3) 2,8~ 973 2,OOg (124) 1,000 4,oog 10:514 20.6X Equ ity 0 0 0 0 0 3,237 0 0 3,237 6.4X 
.............. -. ........ ....... . . ... _-_ ..... . ... 
Total 2,381 2,786 3,095 3,088 2, 604 5,871 6,558 5,157 3,458 6,569 9,375 50,962 100.0X 
Uses of Funds: 
1 , ~~~ 3' m 4, 837 4,432 4'm fixed As • • ts l'l~~ 652 1,018 2,~~ 1,875 4,967 3N6~ 60.6X Dividends 232 247 410 471 620 696 9.6X Taxes 726 958 1,~~~ I,m I'm 314 510 506 473 677 U~~ 9:504 16.6X Other 175 203 663 667 50 585 
'Im) 7,303 14.3X Work ing Capital and Cash '29 74' 144 (465) (2 ,876) (373 ) 458 1,349 (95) 132 (1,639) ·3.2X 
Tota l 2,36' =.~~~~ =.!!2~~ ==~!~~ ==~~~~! 5,87' 6,558 .. ~~!~~ 3,458 6, 589 "'.~~;~ .~2~~~~ 100 . 0X ===== •• : •• ==== ==:== •• . ...... 
Fuller , Smith & Turner plc 
(pounds in thousands) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Fiscal Year End March March March "arch Harch Harch Harch March Harch March March 
INCOME STATEMENT : 
Turnover 19,829 21,510 25,31 8 28,236 32 , 255 36,214 40,643 44,893 49,054 52,935 59,449 COGS HA NA NA 4,479 4,697 
3tm 
5,412 3~:m 4~:m 5,847 5~:22g Gross Prof i t HA NA NA 23,757 27,558 3~:m 47,088 ~:f~~~i at ion 536 601 703 770 902 1, 011 1,353 1,553 ~:m 2, 007 2,274 2,244 2,930 3,394 3,855 4,582 5,800 ~:m 8,033 9,758 Operating Income 1,738 1,643 2,227 2,624 2 , 953 3,~~~ 4,635 6'~~8 7,055 7'm Interest 211 261 240 210 204 214 332 488 Net Inc~ 868 3,663 ',m 1, 524 1,~S 2,075 3,~~~ 3'm 4,328 ~:m ~:m Declared Dividend 198 219 H7 581 977 
BALANCE SHEET: 
Cosh 502 14 651 3,201 3,294 ~:m 5,891 uro 5,285 10,443 r:m Debtors 1, 147 1,320 1, 556 1,969 2,106 2,579 3,145 U~~ Inventory 2,342 3,362 3 , 175 3,245 3,756 4,287 4,599 5,068 5,323 6,243 
Current Assets 3,991 4,696 5,382 8,415 9,156 12,065 13,069 13 , 042 13,753 19, 065 19,828 
Ffxed Assets 9,669 11,217 11,691 29,991 31,804 33,113 59 ' 1*8 61 ' m 64 , 852 69,~"J 101'm Investments 93 122 95 127 149 167 216 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets =! ~~~~ :!~~~~~ 17,168 38,533 .~!~!~~ 45,345 72,419 =~~~~~~ 78,821 =~~~!~~ !~!~~~~ ===::::== :::111:111 •••• iII •••• iII. 
Credi tors 2,881 3,612 3,53~ 5,215 6, 68J 8,607 9,342 8, 28J 9 , 436 10 , 938 12,60~ ST Debt 0 221 0 0 0 182 0 .,. Other 107 128 160 192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-.J 
current L lab; 1 f ti es 2,988 3,961 3,692 5,407 6,681 8,607 9,342 8,281 9,618 10, 938 12,604 
LT Debt 1, 889 1, 961 1,834 ',m l'm 1,697 f:m uro f,~g~ 8,000 Ug~ Other 2,656 375 423 1,410 1,419 Equity 6,220 9,738 11,219 30,908 31 :500 33,631 58,805 61,841 65:,46 68,841 99,656 
Total liabilities & Equity 13,753 =!~~~~~ 17,168 38,533 .:!~!~~ .:~~~:~ =~~~~!~ ::~~~~~~ =r~~~~! =~~~!~~ !~!~~~~ ::;:===== :=====- ••• iII==. 
STATEMENT Of fUNOS: Total X Sources of Funds: 
Operations 2,1~ l,wg 2,7g~ 3,~~ 3, 98J 4, 91J 6, 078 7, 348 8, 343 9, 16~ 10,52~ 60,586 90.6X Other 174 0.3X Oebt 184 96 (29) (160) ( 114) 88 1,108 (144) (44) 5,122 0 6,107 9 . 1X Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11 16 O.OX 
- - . --- .. _._ -----
Total 2,355 2,095 2,703 3,350 3,867 4,999 7,186 7,196 8,304 14,294 10,534 66,883 100. OX 
Uses of Funds : 
Fixed Assets 2,606 2, I 12 856 631 2,~~ 1,391 4,349 3'm 5'm f:m tm 36,204 54 . 1X Olvidend. 206 201 243 305 520 624 1~:m 9 . 6X Taxes 194 320 ( 12) 308 781 1,033 1,4~~ 3,214 2,07~ 1,402 3,~~~ 20.6X Other 0 29 0 37 22 17 20 72 420 0.6X Uorking Capital and Cash (651 ) (567) 1, 616 2,069 84 2,038 751 77 ( 15) 5,161 (544) 10,019 15 . 0X 
--- ---- -
Total ==~~~~~ ==~~~~~ .. ~~~2~ :III:III~~~~~ •• ~b~~ 4,999 ==~~!~ = .. !~!~~ ==~~~~: :III!~~~~~ .!~~~~~ =~~~! 100.0X :111.:: •• == 
Hardys & Hans ons plc (pounds in thousands ) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Fiscal Yl!ar End Sopt Sopt Sept Sept Sept Sopt Sopt Sept Sopt Sept Sopt 
INCOI1E STATEMENT: 
Turnovl!r 13 ,075 14,577 15,913 16,469 17,650 19:~n 20,252 ~g:~~ 21,484 ~~:m 24,891 COGS NA NA 8,735 ~:m 9,721 'g:~~ 1~:~~ l1:m Gross Prof i t NA NA 7'm 7'm 8'm 10'm 12,085 ~:ff~Ai.tion 332 383 421 519 588 632 618 ~:m ~:m 2,654 2,702 2,982 3,431 3,687 ~:m 4,278 ~:bn tm !?Perating Income 2,276 2,28~ 2,54~ 2,954 3,168 3,690 Interl!st 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Net Income 1, 236 1,186 1,~g~ 1,277 "m "m 2,281 ~:Sg~ 2,851 3,467 U~ Declared Oividl!nd 562 602 682 942 1,182 1,412 
8ALANCE SHEET: 
Cash 2,183 2,074 U~~ 2'm 2,929 3,958 5,169 ~:m 7,959 l~:m 'U~i Debtors 816 837 1,071 992 
1:m 
1,375 Inventory 663 733 774 835 855 1,019 1,039 954 995 1,125 
Current Assets 3,662 3,644 4,460 4,700 4,855 5,969 7,408 8,842 10,288 13,561 15,225 
fixed Assl!ts 7, 798 17,943 18,238 18,398 1~:~~2 'x:m 19,320 l~:m 20,527 20,840 22,475 Investments 2,047 2,97g 3,148 3,536 4,317 4,688 4,908 3,4rg Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assl!ts 13,507 =~~~~~ .~~~~~~ 26,634 .~!~~~~ 29, 452 31,045 .~~~~~~ 35,503 39,309 .. ~!~!~ s •• := •• ======= =====:1:= 
.j>. 
00 eredi tors 3,024 3,10g 3,502 3,55~ 3,75~ 3,90~ 4,15~ 4,44~ 4,478 6,43g 5,94~ ST Oebt 0 0 0 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Current liabi l it i es 3,024 3,108 3,502 3,555 3,753 3,905 4,155 4,445 4,478 6,439 5,941 
LT Oebt 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 Other 1,637 1~:g~} 1~:m 2,231 2,133 2,083 1,660 2}:~~ 1,710 521 578 Equity 8,646 20,648 21,_ 23,264 25,030 29,115 32,149 34,460 
Tot.l Lhbflitios & Equity 13,507 24,566 25,846 26,634 .~~~!~~ .~!~!~~ .~!~~~ :I:~~~~~~ .~~~~2; 39,309 .~!~!~ ::===z=: === •• == ======11: ....... 
STATEMENT OF FUNDS : Total X Sources of Funds: 
~rations 2,977 2,89~ 3,056 3, 078 3,37~ 3,90~ 4'1~g 4, 72~ 4'm 5,990 7'm 46'm 99.0X Other 38 0 0 1. OX Oebt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.OX Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O.OX 
Tot.l 3,015 2,894 3,056 3,078 3,371 3,905 4,349 4,748 5,108 5,990 7,130 46,644 100. 0X 
Uses of funds: 
812 Fixed Assets 1,928 651 666 528 618 682 l,g~ 1,016 (32) ~:m 10,565 22.7X Dividends 507 592 617 663 698 781 882 1,128 1,292 9,634 20.7X Taxes 915 978 927 1,213 1,~~~ 1,359 1,389 1,549 1, 51r ',m (~:2$~) 15,766 33.8X Other 12 844 100 326 70 (3) (4) 462 1. OX \lorking Capital and Cash (347) (171) 746 348 8 1,077 1,399 1,226 1,443 3,128 1,360 10,217 21.9% 
.-- .... - . .. ... -. 
Total 3,015 
.. ~~~~~ ==~~~~~ .. ~~~~~ .. ~~~~! .. ~~~~~ 4,349 .. !~~~~ z=~~!~~ 5,990 .. ~~!~2 46,644 100.0X ===== •• 11:====,.. ======= 
t=s H?~ t tR~~sands) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
---- ---- -- ------Fiscal Year End Decenber DecetTber December Decent>er Deceneer Decenber Deceri>er Decetr'ber Oecetrber Dec~r DecetTber 
INCOME STATEMENT: 
Turnover 5,746 6 ,287 7,545 8 ,704 9,418 
19:m 19:m l ~:~g~ 13,410 If'm 17,824 COGS NA NA 4,332 5,087 5,445 6,871 ~:g~~ Gross Profit NA NA 3,213 3,617 3,973 4,3$~ 4,8~ 5,422 6,5~ 7:695 ~~f~DA iati on 85 86 73 73 94 97 116 153 NA NA U~ 1,691 2,271 2,391 ~:m 2,749 H~ 3,301 ~:g~~ Operating Income NA NA 1,618 2,177 2,30~ 2,65~ 3,185 Interest 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 Net Income 683 1,002 1,069 1,033 1,486 l'm 2,gfg 2,219 2,686 2,895 3,724 Declared Dividend 225 270 300 330 420 600 690 780 935 
BALANCE SHEET: 
Cash 2,873 2,602 2,521 5,249 6,043 7,~~ 7,686 8,374 11,000 11,400 13,967 Debtors 270 455 606 568 534 945 829 827 907 1,389 Inventory 390 433 471 495 831 594 674 702 759 821 917 
Current Assets 3,533 3,490 3,598 6,312 7,408 8,505 
--.- _. -
9,305 9,905 12,586 13,128 16,273 
Fixed Assets 6,443 6'm 7,007 7,491 12,558 12,~~~ 13,680 14,297 14'H~ 26,759 27,664 InvestrM'nts 143 1,479 244 210 411 693 859 l,06g Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets 10,119 11,111 12,084 .!~~~~! 20,176 21,580 =~~~~~~ .~~~~~~ 27,536 .~2~!~~ 45,006 ==2:=== ======= = ••• 1I== :Z=::II: •• :. . .. : .. : 
""'-
Credi tors 1,875 2, 11~ 2,311 2,292 2,441 2,58~ 2,87~ 2,81~ 4,41g 3,m 5,O~ \0 ST Debt 0 0 0 223 0 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
current Liabilities 1,875 2,112 2,311 2,292 2,664 2,582 2,871 2,815 4,419 3,m 5,073 
LT Debt 223 223 223 223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Other 51 72 77 l~:m 1~:2~~ l}:g~~ l~:m 960 0 0 0 Equity 7,970 8,704 9,473 21,120 23,117 36,973 39,933 
Total Li abill ties & Equl ty 10,119 =!!~!!! =!~b~~ 14,047 20,176 .~!~~~2 =~~~~~~ =~!~~~~ 27,536 40,746 45,006 1I:::::: •••• ==:2 ==:11:== •• === •• ,.a ==.,.:.=- ....... 
STATEMENT OF FUNDS: Total X Sources of f\Xlds: 
Operations 1,400 1,802 2,21~ 2,402 2,~~~ ~:m 3'm 3,388 4,011 4,528 ~:ro~ 34,341 80.511: Other 0 1,056 l,31g 1,59~ 125 1,53~ 81~~~) 19.3X Debt 0 0 0 0 (112) 0 0 0 · 0.3X Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 172 177 0.4X 
_._-- --.. --- .. _-
Total 1,400 2,858 2,215 3,720 2,732 4,209 3,367 4,982 4,136 6,064 6,967 42,650 100.0X 
Uses of Funds: 
Fixed Assets 157 291 321 537 215 154 l'2~g 676 (122) 820 1,090 5,169 12.1X Dividends 180 225 300 300 330 435 570 630 720 811 l~:m 11.7X Texes 398 618 l,~g~ 156 l,O~~ 1,182 l,2~g 1:H* 1,249 ~:m Utg 28.6X Other 2 1,752 1,255 l'm 1,083 19:m 25.5X \Jorking Capital and Cash 663 (28) (1) 1,472 1,095 536 741 1,296 658 2,208 22.1X 
_._ ----- --_._._- - ---.---
-- ----.- - - .. ---- --- --._- .------- ----_._-Total =.!~!~~ ::~~~~~ ==~~~1~ 3,720 2,732 ==~~~~~ .. ~~~~! 4,982 ==~~!~~ 6,064 6,967 .!~~~~~ 100 . 0X ••••• =. .,..:o;:==a ..a •• =. :1: •••• =. . ...... 
~~8~~ ~~ . ~~o~~:~~I plc 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Fiscal Year End "arch March March "arch March March March March March March March 
iNCOI1E STATEMENT: 
Turnover 20,590 23,722 27,948 30,610 32 , 365 35,566 39,248 t~:m 42,816 45,900 ~~:m COGS NA NA NA NA 15,069 15,918 ~~:m ~~:m 17,446 Gross Prof i t NA NA NA NA 17,296 19,648 24,744 2~:m 33,478 ~=)~~~iation 490 506 m 889 1,097 1,305 H~ ~:m 1,825 U~ 2,238 2,509 3,422 3,620 4,183 4,822 6,196 6,796 Operating Income 1,748 2,003 2,ro~ 2'm 3,086 3'm 3,954 4,~g~ 4,~~~ 4,784 un Interes t 208 451 457 672 751 Net Jncome 1 ,~~~ 1,797 1,~~~ 1,~} 1,512 1,688 1,989 ~:m ~:m 1,931 tm Declared Dividend 450 792 892 1,016 1,377 
BALANCE SHEET : 
Cash 32 29 19 21 23 35 42 27 131 96 68 Debtors ~:m 1,810 ~:r,g 1,972 2,111 ~:m 2,187 ~:m 2,725 3,502 3,260 Inventory 2,540 2,906 3,045 3,660 4,178 4,336 4,550 
Current Assets 4,123 4,379 4,618 4,899 5,179 5,752 5,889 6,535 7,034 7,934 7,878 
Fixed Assets 15,714 47,~~~ 48,~~~ 49,536 50,840 52,972 54,411 99,258 100,676 102,162 108,12~ Investments 0 615 114 114 114 114 114 49 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Assets =!~~~~~ .~!~~!~ :r~~~~~1 =~~~~~~ =~~~!~~ 58,838 =~~~~1~ !~~~~~~ !~~~~~~ 110,145 11~~~~~ ..... "'. 
V1 Credi tors 2,714 3 , 029 2,893 U~~ 4, 258 5,204 ~:$2~ ~:m 6,287 7,400 1~:~~~ 0 ST Debt 1'm 1 , ~~~ 1,643 2, 42J 1,305 4,740 5,64~ Other 382 605 0 0 0 0 0 
Current liabH hies 4,262 4,372 4,918 5,634 6, 679 6,509 7,623 9,523 11,027 13,042 17,914 
LT Debt 1,395 3 , 38~ 3,351 2, 84J ~'~~l 4,069 3,555 ~:m ~'m ~:m 999 Other 124 0 4~:~t~ 3,449 9~:8~ Equi ty 14,056 44,056 45,352 46,575 4(017 45,787 90,052 91 :053 92,466 
Total liabilit i es & Equity 19,837 51,813 53,621 55,050 =~~~!~~ 58,838 60,414 !~~;!2; !~!~~~: !1~~!!~ !!~~~~~ :11:1:11:11=:11::1 ====-=== .z .... .:z'" =&:11"",== "' ...... _==:11==_ 
STATEMENT OF FUNDS: Total X Sources of Funds: 
O~rations 2, 038 2,OO~ 2,60~ 3,022 3,72~ 4,307 4,648 5, 10~ 5,2~ 5,88~ 6,60g 45,198 95.5X Other 0 0 0 0 O.OX Debt 482 1,99~ (22) (8) (8) (11) (12) (15) (10) (13) (266) 2, "8 4.5X Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O. OX 
Total 2,512 3,995 2,580 3,014 3,715 4,296 4,636 5,091 5,254 5,872 6,343 47,308 100.0X 
Uses of Funds : 
Fixed Assets 2,487 3,~~g 2'm l,ro~ 2'h~ 3,416 2,735 3,125 3,090 ~'rJ H~ 3~:~~~ 74.1X Dividends 351 854 929 1:m 1,228 19.9X Taxes 209 (1) 206 261 445 726 804 1,518 1:31~ 1:80~ 8'm 18 . 7X Other 0 0 0 0 113 0 0 0 0 0.2X \lork i n9 Capita 1 and Cash (535) 368 (219) 287 41 (700) 168 (718) (582) 597 (4,872) (6,165) ·13.0X 
Total 2,512 3,995 2,580 3,014 3,715 4,296 4,636 
.. ~~~~! 5,254 5,872 6,343 47,308 100.0X ======= ====_:11: =:::::=:11: • ::====z "':II • • C:II • ======= :IIZ====:II ==.:II==Z ====::Z::I ==::111 ===::111 :11:11_ ==== =:::1== ••• 
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